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a b s t r a c t
A two-person positional game form g (with perfect information and without moves of
chance) is modeled by a finite directed graph (digraph) whose vertices and arcs are
interpreted as positions and moves, respectively. All simple directed cycles of this digraph
together with its terminal positions form the set A of the outcomes. Each non-terminal
position j is controlled by one of two players i ∈ I = {1, 2}. A strategy xi of a player i ∈ I
involves selecting amove (j, j′) in each position j controlled by i. We restrict both players to
their pure positional strategies; in other words, a move (j, j′) in a position j is deterministic
(not random) and it can depend only on j (not on preceding positions or moves or on
their numbers). For every pair of strategies (x1, x2), the selected moves uniquely define
a play, that is, a directed path form a given initial position j0 to an outcome (a directed
cycle or terminal vertex). This outcome a ∈ A is the result of the game corresponding to
the chosen strategies, a = a(x1, x2). Furthermore, each player i ∈ I = {1, 2} has a real-
valued utility function ui over A. Standardly, a game form g is called Nash-solvable if for
every u = (u1, u2) the obtained game (g, u) has a Nash equilibrium (in pure positional
strategies).
A digraph (and the corresponding game form) is called symmetric if (j, j′) is its arc
whenever (j′, j) is. In this paper we obtain necessary and sufficient conditions for Nash-
solvability of symmetric cycle two-person game forms and show that these conditions can
be verified in linear time in the size of the digraph.
© 2011 Elsevier B.V. All rights reserved.
1. Main concepts and results
1.1. Games and game forms
Let A = {a1, . . . , ap} be the set of outcomes, I = {1, 2} be the set of players, and X1 and X2 be the sets of strategies of
players 1 and 2, respectively. (In this paper, we assume that these sets are finite; in particular, we do not consider mixed
strategies.) Let X = X1 × X2 be the direct product of the two strategy sets; its element x = (x1, x2) ∈ X will be called a
strategy profile or situation.
A game form g : X → A is a mapping that assigns an outcome a ∈ A to each situation x ∈ X . Typically, such a mapping is
not injective, that is, the same outcome may be assigned to several distinct situations. A game form g can be conveniently
represented by a matrix, whose rows and columns are labeled by the strategies of the players 1 and 2, respectively, and
whose entries are the corresponding outcomes from A as mapped by g; see examples in Figs. 1 and 2.
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Fig. 1. Four examples of symmetric cycle positional game forms (left) and their normal forms (right). (1) F1 = c1c2 ∨ c3c4, F2 = c1c3 ∨ c2c4, F d1 ≠ F2 .
(2) F1 = c0 ∨ c1c2 ∨ c3c4, F2 = c0c1c3 ∨ c0c2c4, F d1 ≠ F2 . (3) F1 = c0 ∨ c0c1c2 ∨ c0c3c4 ≈ c0, F2 = c0 ∨ c0c1c3 ∨ c0c2c4 ≈ c0, F d1 = F2 .
(4) F1 = c1c2 ∨ c3c4 ∨ c5c6, F2 = c1c3c5 ∨ c2c4c6, F d1 ≠ F2 .
A utility function or payoff is another mapping u : I × A → R. Its value u(i, a) is standardly interpreted as a profit of
player i ∈ I in case when outcome a ∈ A is realized. The pair (g, u) is called a game in normal form. Furthermore, payoff u
and game (g, u) are called zero-sum if u(1, a)+ u(2, a) = 0 for all a ∈ A.
Remark 1. Representation of a game by the pair (g, u) is convenient. In this approach, the game form g is ‘‘responsible for
the structural properties’’, which hold for every payoff u.
In a game (g, u) a situation x∗ = (x∗1, x∗2) ∈ X is called a Nash equilibrium if
u(1, g(x∗1, x
∗
2)) ≥ u(1, g(x1, x∗2)) and u(2, g(x∗1, x∗2)) ≥ u(2, g(x∗1, x2))
for all x1 ∈ X1 and x2 ∈ X2. In other words, in situation x∗ = (x∗1, x∗2) none of the players i ∈ I can profit from replacing x∗i
by another strategy xi, provided the opponent 3− i sticks to the original strategy x∗3−i.
In case of zero-sum two-person games Nash equilibria are also called saddle points.
A game (g, u) is called Nash-solvable if it has a Nash equilibrium. A game form g is called Nash-solvable if for all utility
functions u the corresponding game (g, u) is Nash-solvable.
E. Boros et al. / Discrete Applied Mathematics 159 (2011) 1461–1487 1463
Fig. 2. Solvability of cycles. (1) F1 = c1c2 ∨ c3c4, F2 = c1c3 ∨ c2c4, F d1 ≠ F2 . (2) F1 = c0c1c4 ∨ c0c2c3, F2 = c0 ∨ c1c2 ∨ c1c3 ∨ c2c4, F d1 ≠ F2 .
(3) F1 = c1c2 ∨ c3c4 ∨ c1c4c5 ∨ c2c3c6, F2 = c1c3 ∨ c2c4 ∨ c1c4c6 ∨ c2c3c5, F d1 = F2 . (4) F1 = c1 ∨ c2c3c4 ∨ c2c3c5 ∨ c2c4c6 = c1 ∨ c2(c3c4 ∨ c3c5 ∨ c4c6), F2 =
c1c2 ∨ c1c3c4 ∨ c1c3c6 ∨ c1c4c5 = c1(c2 ∨ c3c4 ∨ c3c6 ∨ c4c5), F d1 = F2 .
Remark 2. Let us note that in this paper we restrict ourselves and the players to pure strategies and do not consider mixed
strategies at all. Otherwise solvability would become trivial, since the existence of a saddle point or Nash equilibrium in
mixed strategies is guaranteed by the von Neumann [47] and Nash [44,45] theorems, respectively. In contrast, solvability of
a game (g, u) in pure strategies is a non-trivial property.
1.2. Cycle games
In this paper we study solvability of the cycle game forms defined as follows. Given a finite directed graph
−→
G in which
loops and multiple arcs are allowed, a vertex j ∈ V = V (−→G ) is called a position and an arc −→e = (j, j′) ∈ E(−→G ) is called
a move from j to j′. Positions of out-degree 0 (that is, with no moves) are called terminal. Let us also fix an initial position
j0 ∈ V .
Furthermore, players 1 and 2 control disjoint sets of positions V1 and V2, which, together with the set VT of all terminals,
formapartition P : V = V1∪V2∪VT . The obtained triplet (−→G , P, j0)will be called a positional cycle game form and interpreted
as follows: In a current position j ∈ Vi player i ∈ I = {1, 2} chooses a move (j, j′) that results in a position j′ ∈ Vi′ , after
which the player i′ ∈ {1, 2} chooses a move (j′, j′′), etc. Two players alternate if digraph −→G is bipartite, yet, in this paper
(unlike [22–24]) we do not make this assumption. The game begins in j0 and either terminates in VT or lasts infinitely.
Let C = C(−→G ) denote the set of all simple directed cycles (dicycles) of digraph −→G . In particular, a loop cj = (j, j) is a
dicycle of length 1 and a pair of oppositely directed edges−→e = (j, j′) and−→e ′ = (j′, j) form a dicycle of length 2. The dicycles
and terminal positions form the set of outcomes, A = C ∪ VT .
Remark 3. It will be convenient to get rid of the terminal positions. To do so, let us introduce a new loop cj = (j, j) for each
terminal vertex j ∈ VT and replace j by this loop. Clearly, after this transformation, the sets of outcomes and dicycles will
coincide. Furthermore, since (j, j) is a unique move in j, we can assign any player to make this move. In the obtained game,
which is obviously equivalent to the original one, VT = ∅ and P : V = V1 ∪ V2. Thus, without loss of generality (w.l.o.g.)
we will assume that VT = ∅, unless the opposite is mentioned explicitly. In fact, Sections 12.2 and 12.3 will be the only
exceptions.
The triplet (
−→
G , P, j0)will be called a positional cycle game form.
To introduce the corresponding normal game form we will need the concept of strategies.
A strategy xi of a player i ∈ I = {1, 2} is a mapping that assigns amove−→e = (j, j′) ∈ −→E to each position j ∈ Vi controlled
by i; in other words, a strategy is a ‘‘general plan’’ of player i for the whole game.
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Remark 4. We assume that the chosen move (j, j′) depends only on the present position j (not on the previous positions or
moves of the play or on their numbers) and also that the choice is deterministic (not random). In other words, we restrict
ourselves and the players to their pure positional strategies.
Let us denote by Xi the set of all such strategies of player i ∈ I = {1, 2} and let X = X1 × X2 be the set of all situations.
Thus, a situation x = (x1, x2) ∈ X defines a unique move in each position j ∈ V . In particular, these moves determine
a unique directed path (dipath) p = p(x) = p(x1, x2) that begins in the given initial position j0 and leads to a dicycle
c = c(x, j0) = c(x1, x2, j0) ∈ C . Indeed, since all players are restricted to their pure positional strategies, for each vertex
j ∈ p, there is a unique arc −→e (j, x) leaving vertex j. Hence, p has at most one vertex of in-degree 0 (the initial position j0)
and at most one with in-degree 2, after which the dipath will cycle along c . For all other positions of p both the in- and
out-degrees are equal to 1. (Let us recall that VT = ∅, by Remark 3.) In other words, each play p = p(x) forms a ‘‘lasso’’, that
is, it consists of an initial dipath (if any) followed by an infinitely repeated dicycle c = c(x, j0).
Thus, we obtain a mapping g(
−→
G , P, j0) : X → C(−→G ), which is the normal form of the positional cycle game form
(
−→
G , P, j0). For brevity, wewill also call g = g(−→G , P, j0) a cycle game form, and (g(−→G , P, j0), u) = (−→G , P, j0, u) a cycle game,
where u : I × A → R is a utility function. For clarity, we will refer to the unique outcome corresponding to the situation
x = (x1, x2) as g(x1, x2) = c(x1, x2, j0), in order to emphasize that this outcome depends also on the initial position j0 ∈ V .
As before, we call a cycle game form g = g(−→G , P, j0) solvable if the corresponding game (g, u) = g(−→G , P, j0, u) is
solvable, that is, if (g, u) has a Nash equilibrium for every payoff function u.
Furthermore, a Nash equilibrium x∗ = (x∗1, x∗2) of a cycle game (g, u) = (g(
−→
G , P, j0), u) is called uniform (or subgame
perfect) if it remains a Nash equilibrium for every initial position j0 ∈ V . Respectively, a cycle game (g, u) (game form g)
will be called uniformly solvable if it has a uniform Nash equilibrium (for all u).
Finally, a pair (
−→
G , P)will be called
• solvable if for each j0 and u the obtained cycle game g(−→G , P, j0, u) is solvable and
• uniformly non-solvable if there is a payoff u such that game g(−→G , P, j0, u) is not solvable for any j0 ∈ V .
1.3. Symmetric, strongly connected and 2-connected digraphs, subgraphs, and pairs
Standardly, a digraph
−→
G = (V ,−→E ) is called strongly connected if for every two vertices j′, j′′ ∈ V there is a dipath
from j′ to j′′. Furthermore, a digraph will be called strongly 2-connected if it is strongly connected and remains strongly
connected after eliminating any vertex. For example, a single vertex, a loop, or two oppositely directed edges form strongly
2-connected digraphs (they will be called trivial), while two series pairs of oppositely directed edges do not: this digraph is
strongly connected but not 2-connected.
The main goal of this paper is a characterization and efficient recognition of solvable cycle game forms. Although it looks
too difficult in general, yet, we will solve this problem in an important special case.
A digraph
−→
G = (V ,−→E ) is called symmetric if (j′, j′′) ∈ −→E whenever (j′′, j′) ∈ −→E .
In this case, the corresponding pair (
−→
G , P), game form g(
−→
G , P, j0), and game g(
−→
G , P, j0, u) are called symmetric, too.
Similarly, they are called strongly connected or 2-connectedwhenever
−→
G is.
Remark 5. Let us note that the transformation of Remark 3 preserves symmetry. Hence, we can still assume w.l.o.g. that in
the symmetric games the set of outcomes is the set of all dicycles.
We call
−→
G = (V ,−→E ) a subgraph of−→G′ = (V ′,−→E ′ ) if V ⊆ V ′ and−→E ⊆ −→E ′ and use the notation−→G ≤ −→G′ .
Furthermore, if P = (V1, V2) and P ′ = (V ′1, V ′2) are partitions of V and V ′ thenwe call the pair (
−→
G , P) a subpair of (
−→
G′ , P ′)
and use the notation (
−→
G , P) ≤ (−→G′ , P ′) if V1 = V ′1 ∩ V , V2 = V ′2 ∩ V , and
−→
G ≤ −→G′ .
1.4. Main results
We will show that a strongly connected pair (
−→
G , P) is either solvable or uniformly non-solvable.
Furthermore, solvability of the symmetric pairs can be efficiently characterized and verified in linear time. We will
introduce a family
−→
F of solvable symmetric strongly 2-connected pairs and prove that a symmetric pair is solvable if and
only if all its strongly 2-connected components are in
−→
F . This statement will be made explicit by Theorems 3–5 below; see
also Fig. 3 and the definitions of Sections 2 and 3.
These theorems strengthen and complete earlier results of [22–24], where a criterion of solvability was announced (and
its proof sketched) for the case of bipartite symmetric digraphs. In this paperwe get rid of the first assumption (bipartiteness),
slightly correct the original statement (see Remark 16 below), and give an accurate proof. Yet, since it is quite long, we will
refer the reader to the research report [8] for some technical details; see Section 11.
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Fig. 3. Solvable 2-connected pairs; dashed lines may be 1-edges but solid lines cannot correspond to 0- or 1-edges.
Of course, it would be good to get rid of the second assumption (symmetry), as well, and obtain a general criterion
of solvability for the two-person cycle game forms. As Kukushkin remarked [39], this assumption is very simple but not
very natural; unlike bipartiteness, it does not hold for parlor games, like Chess or Go. In fact, symmetry is just a technical
assumption but our proof is heavily based on it.
Remark 6. Another interesting type of game tractable for the symmetric digraphs and intractable in general is the so-called
‘‘Geography’’: Two players take turns moving a token along the arcs of a given finite digraph
−→
G = (V ,−→E ), beginning with
a given initial vertex j0 ∈ V . The game is over as soon as a vertex j ∈ V is repeated twice and the player who made the last
move (that results in the repetition) loses. It is NP-hard to solve this game [21]. Yet, the problem becomes polynomial for
symmetric digraphs. The first player wins if and only if there is a maximum matching incident to j0 [12,17]. To verify this
condition it is sufficient to compare the sizes of maximummatchings in
−→
G and
−→
G [V \ {j0}] and this problem is polynomial
due to [13].
In our proofs it will be instrumental that solvability is anti-monotone with respect to the subgraph/subpair ≤ relation.
More precisely, the following statement will be shown in Section 5.
Theorem 1. Given a cycle game form (
−→
G , P, j0) and a pair (
−→
G′ , P ′) such that
• (i) (−→G , P, j0) is not solvable;
• (ii) (−→G , P) ≤ (−→G′ , P ′);
• (iii) for every position j in−→G′ there is a directed path from j to j0;
then pair (
−→
G′ , P ′) is uniformly non-solvable.
Example in Fig. 1(2) shows that condition (iii) is essential; see Example 1 below for more details.
Obviously, condition (iii) always holds for strongly connected digraphs, implying the next two claims.
Corollary 1. A strongly connected pair (
−→
G , P) is either solvable or uniformly non-solvable. 
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Corollary 2. If (
−→
G , P) ≤ (−→G′ , P ′) for two strongly connected pairs and the second one (−→G′ , P ′) is solvable then the first one
(
−→
G , P) is solvable too. 
Remark 7. Even if a pair (
−→
G , P) is solvable and a payoff u is zero-sum, the values of games (
−→
G , P, j0, u)may still depend on
the initial position j0. If, for any u, they do not then pair (
−→
G , P) is called ergodic. Simple necessary and sufficient conditions
for ergodicity were obtained in [34]. Yet, verification of these conditions is NP-complete [34], see also Appendix 2 of [8].
In general, a property or a function of a game (
−→
G , P, j0, u) or triple (
−→
G , P, j0)will be called uniform if it does not depend
on the initial position j0. For example, by Corollary 1, solvability is a uniform property. Yet, distinct Nash equilibria may
correspond to distinct initial positions.
Given a strategy of a player, it is easy to show that there is a uniform best response (BR) of the opponent, that is, a strategy
that maximizes his payoff simultaneously for each possible initial position j0 ∈ V ; see Section 4.1. (However, unlike the BR
strategy, the obtained payoff may depend on j0.)
In Section 4.2, for the zero-sumcase,wewill prove amore difficult result: player 1 (respectively, 2) has a uniformmaxmin
(respectively, minmax) strategy. Thus, although maxmin and minmax may differ, yet, each of them can be realized by a
single strategy for all initial positions simultaneously.
However, this statement cannot be extended to the non-zero-sum case. In Section 4.4, we give an example of a solvable
symmetric two-person cycle game which is not uniformly solvable; in other words, Nash equilibria exist for all initial
positions but none of these equilibriums is subgame perfect, that is, the corresponding strategies do depend on the initial
position.
2. On solvability of two-person game forms
A two-person game form g is called zero-sum-solvable (respectively, ±1 solvable) if for each zero-sum payoff u
(respectively, zero-sum u that takes only values±1) the obtained game (g, u) is Nash-solvable.
It appears (see Theorem 2 below) that all three properties of a game form g : X1 × X2 → A (Nash-, zero-sum-, and
±1-solvability) are equivalent. Moreover, they are also equivalent to the following property. To each outcome a ∈ A we
assign a Boolean variable and denote it, for simplicity, by the same symbol a, and to each player i ∈ I we assign a monotone
disjunctive normal form (DNF) as follows:
F1 = F1(g) =

x1∈X1

x2∈X2
g(x1, x2) F2 = F2(g) =

x2∈X2

x1∈X1
g(x1, x2). (1)
The game form g is called tight if these two DNFs define dual monotone Boolean functions, that is, F d1 = F2. In other words,
g is tight if and only if the sets of outcomes in the rows and columns of the corresponding table form two dual (transversal)
hypergraphs on the ground set A. For example, in Fig. 1 only the third game form is tight and in Fig. 2 only the last two game
forms are tight.
Remark 8. Let us notice the similarity of the DNFs defined by (1) to maxmin and minmax, respectively. Duality F d1 = F2
‘‘indicates’’ that maxmin and minmax are equal for every payoff.
The definition of tightness can be reformulated in several equivalentways. For example, g is tight if and only if B1∩B2 ≠ ∅
for any two sets of outcomes B1, B2 ⊆ A such that B1 (respectively, B2) has an outcome in each column (respectively, row) of
the table of g . More combinatorial reformulations of tightness in terms of this table can be found in [26–28]; see also [4,8].
Theorem 2 ([14,25,26]). The following properties of two-person game forms are equivalent: (i) tightness; (ii) Nash-solvability;
(iii) zero-sum solvability; (iv)±1-solvability.
Game forms satisfying these properties will be called just solvable.
Implications (ii)⇒ (iii)⇒ (iv) follow immediately from the definitions. Equivalence of (i), (iii), and (iv) was shown in
1970 by Edmonds and Fulkerson [14] and independently in [25]. In 1975, this list was extended by the statement (ii) [26];
see also [28,4].
Remark 9. Verification of tightness of a given game form is a fundamental open problem of complexity theory in computer
science. No polynomial-time algorithm is known, yet, a quasi-polynomial one exists [18]. (Its execution time is No(logN),
where N is the bit input complexity.) Hence, the problem is not NP-complete unless all problems from NP can be solved in
quasi-polynomial time.
3. On solvability of symmetric cycle game forms
3.1. Graphs assigned to symmetric digraphs
Let us define a symmetric digraphs
−→
G = (V ,−→E )more accurately. For any two distinct vertices j, j′ ∈ V , let k(j, j′) denote
the number of arcs in
−→
E directed from j to j′. A digraph
−→
G is called symmetric if k(j, j′) = k(j′, j) for all distinct j, j′ ∈ V .
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Remark 10. Soon we will see that both game forms (
−→
G , P, j) and (
−→
G , P, j′) are non-solvable whenever k(j, j′) ≥ 2,
k(j′, j) ≥ 2, and j and j′ are controlled by two distinct players; see Figs. 1(1) and 2(1). Furthermore, w.l.o.g. we can assume
that k(j, j′) ≤ 1 (and k(j′, j) ≤ 1) whenever j and j′ are controlled by the same player. Both claims will immediately follow
from the results of this section. Hence, we can assume that, in a symmetric solvable game form, k(j, j′) takes only values 0
and 1, or in other words, that any two parallel edges are oppositely directed. In particular, a digraph
−→
G is not symmetric
whenever (j, j′) ∈ −→E , while (j′, j) ∉ −→E for distinct j, j′ ∈ V . In case j = j′ we will assume that k(j) = 1 when (j, j) is the
loop assigned to the terminal position j ∈ VT , otherwise k(j) = 0.
To a symmetric digraph
−→
G = (V ,−→E ), we assign a (non-directed) graph G = G(−→G ) = (V , E) as follows: E contains k
(non-directed) edges between j and j′ whenever k(j, j′) = k(j′, j) = k; in particular, to a directed loop of −→G we assign a
non-directed loop in G.
A pair (G, P) is called solvablewhenever the corresponding symmetric pair (
−→
G , P) is solvable. Obviously, (G, P) is solvable
if and only if all its connected components are solvable.
3.2. Reduction to 2-connected graphs
Let us recall that a graph G is 2-connected if it is connected and remains connected after deleting any of its vertices. For
example, a single vertex or edge are 2-connected graphs (theywill be called trivial), while the simple path P3, which consists
of two successive edges, is not 2-connected.
The following claim results immediately from the definitions.
Lemma 1. A symmetric digraph
−→
G is strongly connected (respectively, strongly 2-connected) if and only if the corresponding
non-directed graph G is connected (respectively, 2-connected). 
A pair (G, P)will be called connected or 2-connected whenever the corresponding graph G is. In particular, one can talk
about connected and 2-connected components of a pair (G, P).
Subgraphs and subpairs are introduced for the non-directed case similarly to the directed one. We will say that G′ =
(V ′, E ′) is a subgraph of G = (V , E) if V ′ ⊆ V and E ′ ⊆ E. The notation will be G′ ≤ G and it will be G′ < G whenever at
least one of the above two containments is strict. Furthermore, we say that (G′, P ′) is majorized by (G, P) if G′ = (V ′, E ′)
is a subgraph of G = (V , E) and partition P ′ : V ′ = V ′1 ∪ V ′2 is a subpartition of P : V = V1 ∪ V2 induced by the subsets
V ′1 = V1 ∩V ′ and V ′2 = V2 ∩V ′. Respectively, we will use notation (G′, P ′) ≤ (G, P)when G′ ≤ G and (G′, P ′) < (G, P)when
G′ < G. By these definitions and Lemma 1, Corollaries 1 and 2 can be reformulated for the non-directed case as follows.
Corollary 3. • (a) A connected pair (G, P) is either solvable or uniformly non-solvable.
• (b) If pair (G, P) is solvable and (G′, P ′) ≤ (G, P) then pair (G′, P ′) is solvable too.
Since a pair (G, P) is solvable if and only if all its connected components are solvable, we can restrict ourselves to
connected graphs. Moreover, we can assume that G is 2-connected, due to the following statement, which will be proven in
Section 5.
Theorem 3. A pair (G, P) is solvable if and only if all its 2-connected components are solvable.
In particular, pair (G, P) is solvable when it has only trivial 2-connected components.
Corollary 4. A pair (G, P) is solvable when G is a forest. 
We will introduce a family F of solvable 2-connected pairs and prove that a pair (G, P) is solvable if and only if all its
2-connected components are in F .
3.3. Solvability of simple cycles
Proposition 1. Let G be a simple cycle, a pair (G, P) is solvable if and only if
(V1 = V , V2 = ∅), or (V2 = V , V1 = ∅), or (|V1| > 1 and |V2| > 1).
In other words, (G, P) is not solvable if and only if (|V1| = 1 and V2 ≠ ∅) or (|V2| = 1 and V1 ≠ ∅). A pair (G, P) satisfying
this condition will be called a 1-cycle. Four examples in Fig. 2 illustrate this statement, which will be proven in Section 7.2.
Remark 11. Cycles are 2-connected and solvable (except for 1-cycles), by Proposition 1; yet, they are not maximal solvable
pairs; see Remark 13 below.
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3.4. Reducing (G, P) to (G,P )
To characterize solvable 2-connected pairs (G, P)we will need one more transformation.
To each pair (G, P) with G = (V , E) and P : V = V1 ∪ V2 let us assign a graph (V, E) and P : V = V1 ∪ V2 =
(V1 ∩V)∪ (V2 ∩V) as follows. LetV ⊆ V be the set of all vertices of degree at least 3 in G, which will be called nodes. Given
two nodes j′, j′′ ∈ V and a simple path p = p(j′, j′′) between them that contains no other node, let us assign to p an edge
e = e(p) between j′ and j′′. Furthermore, let E denote the set of all such edges. We call p a 0-path (respectively, 1-path) if all
vertices of p (respectively, all but exactly one), including j′ and j′′, are controlled by one player. All other paths will be called
regular. The corresponding edge e(p) ∈ E will be called a 0-edge, 1-edge, or a regular edge, respectively. Clearly, if j′ = j′′, a
path turns into a simple cycle and we obtain the corresponding concepts of 0-, 1-, or regular cycles in G.
It is also clear that if G itself is a simple cycle thenV = ∅; yet, if G is any other 2-connected graph thenV ≠ ∅ and graph
(V, E) is 2-connected too. Let G = (V; E, E0, E1) denote the obtained graph together with the sets of its 0- and 1-edges. Let
us note that several distinct graphs G can result in the same G.
A pair (G,P ) is called solvable if every corresponding pair (G, P) is solvable.
Remark 12. In fact, solvability of at least one pair is already sufficient. Yet, the sets of 0- and 1-edges do matter. Both claims
will follow from the results of this section; see Propositions 2–5 and Theorem 4 below.
A pair (G,P ) is called bipartite if G is a bipartite graph, G = (V1,V2, E), and P : V = V1 ∪ V2 is the corresponding
partition. In the figures, we color positions of players 1 and 2 by white and black, respectively. By black-and-white coloring
we denote ‘uncertain’’ positions, that is, the casewhen both options, j ∈ V1 or j ∈ V2, are possible.More precisely, a partition
P with ℓ black-and-white positions represents 2ℓ distinct partitions rather than one. For example, each terminal position
j ∈ VT is uncertain, since the corresponding loop is a uniquemove in j and it does not matter which player makes this move.
3.5. Solvable θ-pairs
Let us consider the family of bipartite pairs (θk,Pk) on the top of Fig. 3, where k = 1, 2, . . ..
Graphs θk contain two types of edges: simple (type 1) and parallel (type 2), which alternate when k ≥ 2, while θ1 is a
sort of exception; it consists of two vertices and three parallel edges; see Fig. 3.
Proposition 2. A pair (θk,Pk) is solvable unless it contains a 1-edge of type 2.
Let us underline that 1-edges of type 1 do not contradict solvability. Let us also notice that, since graphs (θk,Pk) are
bipartite for all k, they cannot contain 0-edges.
Remark 13. Each graph θk contains a simple cycle as a proper (not induced) subgraph. Furthermore, (θk+1,Pk+1) > (θk,Pk)
for all k and, hence, (θk,Pk) is an infinite chain of nested solvable 2-connected pairs. This chain has no maximal element
with respect to relation>.
3.6. Solvable pairs (K4,P ) and (K3,3,P )
Next, let G = K4 and P consist of two white, one black, and one black-and-white positions. In fact, this case represents
two subcases: (K4,P ′) and (K4,P ′′); see Fig. 3.
Proposition 3. Pair (K4,P ) is solvable unless it contains a 0- or 1-edge.
Remark 14. Let us notice that both pairs (K4,P ′) and (K4,P ′′)majorize (θ1,P1).
Now, let us consider the bipartite pair (K3,3,P ) in Fig. 3.
Proposition 4. Pair (K3,3,P ) is solvable unless it contains a 1-edge.
Let us recall that bipartite pairs cannot contain 0-edges.
Remark 15. It is easily seen that (K3,3,P ) > (K4,P ′′). Indeed, (K3,3 − e,P ) contains two simple paths of length 2; let
us substitute two edges for them and get (K4,P ′′). In contrast, (K3,3,P ) ≱ (K4,P ′).
3.7. Solvable monochromatic pairs
A pair (G,P ) is called monochromatic if (V = V1 and V2 = ∅) or (V = V2 and V1 = ∅). To characterize solvable
monochromatic pairs we will need one more transformation. Given a pair (G, P), let us consider the corresponding pair
(G,P ), duplicate every 0-edge in it, and denote the obtained pair by (G0,P ).
E. Boros et al. / Discrete Applied Mathematics 159 (2011) 1461–1487 1469
Proposition 5. A monochromatic pair (G,P ) is solvable unless (G0,P ) contains a 1-edge and two more edge-disjoint simple
paths between its ends.
Remark 16. In [22–24], the monochromatic case was not treated accurately. It was claimed that a monochromatic pair
(G,P ) is solvable unless it contains a 1-edge.
3.8. Main theorem and comments
In Sections 10 and 11, we will obtain the following criterion summarizing the above five propositions and also showing
that there are no other solvable cycle symmetric game forms.
Let F denote the family of all 2-connected solvable symmetric pairs (G,P ) from Propositions 1–5; all of them, except
for the monochromatic pairs and simple cycles, are shown in Fig. 3.
Remark 17. Together with a pair (G,P ), by symmetry, F must contain the pair (G,P ), where partitions P and P are
complementary, that is, the black and white vertices are switched in them. Yet, let us note that all pairs in F are self-
complementary, except for (K4,P ′). Thus, we have to add only one pair: (K4,P ′) with the central white and three black
vertices.
Theorem 4. A pair (G,P ) is solvable if and only if all its 2-connected components are in F .
In particular, a pair (G, P) is solvable when graph G contains only trivial 2-connected subgraphs, or when G is a simple
cycle, yet, not a 1-cycle.
Theorem 5. Solvability of a symmetric cycle game form (
−→
G , P, j0) can be verified in linear time.
Proof. It follows from Theorem 4. First, let us check whether digraph
−→
G is symmetric. If it is not, Theorems 4 and 5 are
not applicable. If it is, let us construct pairs (G, P) and (G,P ); then consider the 2-connected components of the latter and
verify whether they all belong to F . If they do then the considered game form is solvable, otherwise it is not. 
3.9. A plan of the proofs
Our proof of Theorem 4 is based on Theorems 1 and 3. By the last one, it is enough to list all solvable 2-connected
pairs (G,P ). Fortunately, they can all be obtained in a subgraph-monotone-increasing order, by the so-called Lovasz ear-
extension Lemma [40]; see Section 11. We will apply the standard depth-first search procedure, backtracking whenever a
current ear-extension results in a not-solvable pair. Indeed, no solvable pair can be obtained by extending a not-solvable one,
since solvability is anti-monotone, by Corollary 3(b). We will output all maximal solvable pairs and also obtain an infinite
monotone increasing chain of solvable pairs (θk,Pk), k = 1, 2, . . . ; this chain has no maximum. Thus, family F is formed.
Our tests of solvability will be based on Theorem 8(i) and (ii), which provide sufficient conditions for the uniform non-
solvability and solvability, respectively; see Section 9.
In Section 4 we prove that there are uniform maxmin and minmax strategies of two players (Theorem 6) and derive
from this fact the standard dynamic Bellman–Shapley equations for maxmin and minmax (Theorem 7), which appear to
be non-trivial for the cycle games [39]. These equations will be instrumental in proofs of the Theorems 1 and 3 in Section 5.
The special role of 1-paths is analyzed in Section 9.
The ‘‘if’’ and ‘‘only if’’ parts of Theorem 4 are proven in Sections 10 and 11, respectively. Finally, in the last section we
survey results on Nash-solvability of three other (not cycle) types of positional game forms.
4. On uniform best responses, maxmin and minmax strategies
In this section we prove the existence of uniform maxmin and minmax strategies and derive from this result the
Bellman–Shapley equations for the maxmin and minmax values. Here we consider arbitrary (not necessarily symmetric)
digraphs and zero-sum (but not necessarily±1) payoffs.
4.1. Uniformly best responses
Let us recall that in a cycle game form (
−→
G , P, j0) each pair of strategies (x1 ∈ X1, x2 ∈ X2) of players 1 and 2 results in a
play p = p(x1, x2, j0) that defines a lasso with a dicycle c = c(x1, x2, j0).
A strategy x2 ∈ X2 is called a best response (BR) to a given strategy x1 ∈ X1 if for every strategy x′2 ∈ X2 the dicycle
c = c(x1, x2, j0) is at least as good for player 2 as c ′ = c(x1, x′2, j0), that is, u(1, c) ≤ u(1, c ′).
If this inequality holds for all possible initial positions j0 then x2 is called a uniform BR to x1.
Proposition 6. For every fixed x1, a uniform BR x2 to x1 exists.
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Proof. It is obvious. Given x1, we obtain a one-person game of player 2 on a digraph G′ = (V ′, E ′). Let c ′ be a dicycle of G′
best for player 2 and W ′ ⊆ V ′ be the set of all positions from which c ′ can be reached. Let us fix corresponding moves in
these positions and then eliminate them from V ′; denote the remaining set by V ′′ = V ′ \W ′ and the corresponding induced
subdigraph by G′′ = G′[V ′′]. Let c ′′ be a dicycle of G′′ best for player 2, etc. By these iterations, we obtain a strategy x2, which
is a uniform BR to x1. 
4.2. Uniformmaxmin andminmax strategies
The following result is less trivial. Let (
−→
G , P, j0, u) be a (two-person zero-sum) cycle game; x1 ∈ X1 is called a maxmin
strategy of player 1 if itmaximizes his payoff in theworst-case scenario; in otherwords, if for every strategy x′1 the inequality
u(1, c) ≥ u(1, c ′) holds, where c = c(x1, x2, j0) and c ′ = c(x′1, x′2, j0), while x2 and x′2 are BRs of player 2 to x1 and
x′1, respectively. If the above inequality holds for all possible initial positions j0 simultaneously then x1 is called a uniform
maxmin strategy.
Theorem 6. A uniformmaxmin strategy exists in every two-person zero-sum cycle game.
Proof. For a given strategy x1 ∈ X1 of the maximizer and a given initial position j ∈ V let
v1(j, x1) = min
x2∈X2
u(1, c(x1, x2, j)) and v1(j) = max
x1∈X1
v1(j, x1).
Furthermore, let x1(j) denote the maxmin strategy of player 1 realizing the above maximum from initial position j ∈ V . Let
us then label all positions V = {j1, j2, . . . , jn} such that
v1(j1) ≥ v1(j2) ≥ · · · ≥ v1(jn). (2)
Finally, to any strategy x1 ∈ X1 of player 1 let us assign the vector w(x1) = (v1(j1, x1), . . . , v1(jn, x1)) and then choose
x∗1 ∈ X1 forwhich this vectorw(x∗1) is lexicographicallymaximal. To simplify notation, let us denote byw∗i the i-th coordinate
ofw(x∗1), that is,w
∗
i = v1(ji, x∗1) for i = 1, . . . , n.
We claim that x∗1 is a uniform maxmin-strategy. In other words, we claim that
v1(j, x∗1) = v1(j) for all positions j ∈ V . (3)
Let us assume indirectly that (3) does not hold and let i be the smallest index for which
v1(ji) > v1(ji, x∗1) = w∗i . (4)
LetW = {j1, j2, . . . , ji−1}; notice thatW ≠ ∅, that is, i > 1, sincew∗ = w(x∗1) is lexicographically maximal.
Let us fix the strategy x∗1 for player 1, consider the resulting subgraph G∗, and denote by A the set of vertices reachable
fromW in G∗. Let us first note that every cycle c in the subgraph of G∗ induced by A is reachable from some vertex jk ∈ W
by some strategy of player 2, and hence we must have by (2) that
u(1, c) ≥ v1(jk) ≥ v1(ji). (5)
Since v1(ji, x∗1) < v1(ji) by our assumption, player 2 has a strategy x2 ∈ X2 which prevents player 1 to reach A from the initial
point ji; in particular ji ∉ A. Let us then consider the strategyx1 of player 1, which agrees with x∗1 for vertices in A and agrees
with x1(ji) for vertices outside of A. Clearly, this strategy guarantees the same as x∗1 for all initial points inW . Moreover, we
claim that it guarantees v1(ji), from initial point ji, implying by (4) that vector w(x1) is lexicographically larger than w(x∗1),
contradicting the choice of x∗1 and hence proving the theorem.
To see the last claim, let us consider an arbitrary strategy x2 ∈ X2 for player 2 and the play p = p(x1, x2, ji). If p enters A
then cycle c(x1, x2, ji) is in A, since none of its arcs leaves A and, thus, u(1, c(x1, x2, ji)) ≥ v1(ji), by (5). On the other hand,
if p avoids A then c(x1, x2, ji) = c(x1(ji), x2, ji), by the definition ofx1 and hence u(1, c(x1, x2, ji)) = u(1, c(x1(ji), x2, ji)) ≥
v1(ji), by the definition of v1(ji). Thus,x1 guarantees for player 1 at least v1(ji). 
Of course, players 1 and 2 can be swapped in both Proposition 6 and Theorem 6. Hence, the latter implies the existence
of a uniform minmax strategy in every two-person zero-sum cycle game.
Remark 18. In fact, restriction to the two-person zero-sum games is not essential and both statements can be easily
extended to n-person games, as follows. Given a player i ∈ I , let us standardly define a two-person zero-sum game of i
against the coalition I \ {i} of all other players. In this game, a uniform BR xi = xi(xI\{i}) and maxmin strategy x0i exist, by
Proposition 6 and Theorem 6, respectively. By definition, xi is a uniform BR and x0i is a uniform cautious (maxmin) strategy
in the original n-person game.
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4.3. Howmaxmin andminmax values depend on initial positions
For a two-person zero-sum cycle game (
−→
G , P, j0, u), maxmin and minmax are introduced as
v1 = v1(j0) = max
x1∈X1
min
x2∈X2
u(1, c(x1, x2, j0)) and v2 = v2(j0) = min
x2∈X2
max
x1∈X1
u(1, c(x1, x2, j0)),
respectively, where j0 is the initial position. The following statement is based on Theorem 6 and is instrumental in the proof
of Theorems 1 and 3 in the next section.
Theorem 7. For each move from j to j′ we have:
(i) v1(j′) ≤ v1(j) and v2(j′) ≤ v2(j) when j ∈ V1;
(ii) v1(j′) ≥ v1(j) and v2(j′) ≥ v2(j) when j ∈ V2.
Moreover, for each position j ∈ V = V1 ∪ V2 there are moves (j, j′) and (j, j′′) such that
(i′) v1(j′) = v1(j) and (ii′) v2(j′′) = v2(j).
Obviously, the statements of this theorem can be equivalently reformulated as follows:
(i1) v1(j) = max{v1(j′) | (j, j′) ∈ −→E }, (i2) v2(j) = max{v2(j′′) | (j, j′′) ∈ −→E } for j ∈ V1;
(i1′) v1(j) = min{v1(j′) | (j, j′) ∈ −→E }, (i2′) v2(j) = min{v2(j′′) | (j, j′′) ∈ −→E } for j ∈ V2.
Remark 19. These equations look very standard. However, as Kukushkin noticed [39], for cycle games they are not trivial
and need an accurate proof. In particular, he mentioned that all similar claims would fail in case when payoffs may depend
not only on the resulting cycle c = c(x1, x2, j) but on the whole lasso p = p(x1, x2, j) or just on c and the entrance
vertex to c.
Proof of Theorem 7. It is based, in particular, on Theorem 6.
By symmetry, let us assume w.l.o.g. that j ∈ V1 and derive (i1) and (i2).
Let us begin with (i1) and assume that a maxmin strategy x1(j) of player 1 guarantees v1(j) for the initial position j.
Clearly, this strategy selects a move (j, j′) in j, since j ∈ V1. It is also clear that the same strategy x1(j) guarantees to player 1
(the maximizer) the same result v1(j)with respect to the initial position j′, as well. Hence, v1(j) ≤ v1(j′) and we obtain the
inequality≤ in (i1).
The inverse inequality is less trivial, since (j, j′)might be a bad move with respect to the initial position j′, as Kukushkin
noticed [39]. Let us consider a maxmin strategy x1(j′) that guarantees v1(j′).
If, playing against this strategy, 2 cannot reach j from j′ then let us modify x1(j′) (if necessary) by selecting the move
(j, j′) in j. Obviously, the obtained strategy x′1(j′) guarantees the same result v1(j′)with respect to both j′ and j, as well. Thus,
v1(j′) ≤ v1(j), in agreement with (i1). Hence, we can assume that, playing against x1(j′), player 2 can reach j from j′ by a
dipath p(j′, j). Moreover, let us assume indirectly that beginningwith j player 2, by a dipath p(j, c), can reach a dicycle c such
that u(1, c) < v1(j). To get a contradiction, let us show that 2 can get c , against x1(j′), beginningwith j′, as well. Indeed, to do
so, (s)he can just startwith p(j′, j) and proceedwith p(j, c). Although the obtained dipath p(j′, c)may have self-intersections,
yet standardly, we can get rid of them by eliminating simple dicycles from p(j′, c) one by one. This procedure results in a
simple dipath from j′ to c and in a contradiction, proving inequality≥ in (i1).
Let us proceed with (i2) and assume that player 1 controls a position j0 ∈ V1, in which (s)he has k possible moves (j0, ji),
where i ∈ [k] = {1, . . . , k}. Furthermore, let v2(ji) and x2(ji) denote the corresponding k+1 guaranteed results andminmax
strategies of player 2, for i = 0, 1, . . . , k.
Let us show that v2(j0) ≥ v2(ji) for all i ∈ [k]. By definition of v2(ji), for each strategy x2 ∈ X2 of player 2, player 1 has a
strategy x1 that guarantees v′ ≥ v2(ji), starting from ji. Let p be the corresponding play, ending in a cycle c with u(1, c) = v′.
If p goes through j0 then the same x1 results in c , starting from j0, too. Otherwise, let us change x1, if necessary, by switching
the first move to (j0, ji), yielding again c .
The inverse statement, v2(j0) ≤ v2(ji) for some i ∈ [k], ismore sophisticated, yet, it follows immediately from Theorem6.
Applying it to player 2, we derive that (s)he has a strategy x2 that guarantees v2(j) for all positions j ∈ V simultaneously
and, in particular, for all ji, where i ∈ [k]. It is easily seen that playing against x2 and beginning from j0 player 1 cannot get
more than max(v2(ji) | i ∈ [k]). 
4.4. Uniform Nash equilibria may fail to exist
In contrast, even in solvable symmetric two-person cycle games Nash equilibria may be not uniform. In other words,
Theorem 6 is not generalized for the non-zero-sum case. For example, let us consider the symmetric cycle two-person
game form (G, P) in Fig. 4 and payoff u : {1, 2} × {c0, c1, c2} → R such that u(1, c0) > u(1, c1) > u(1, c2) and
u(2, c1) > u(2, c2) > u(2, c0). For every initial position j, in the obtained game (G, P, j, u) a unique Nash equilibrium
exists but it depends on j. The equilibrium outcome is c1 when j is White and c2 when j is Black, while no uniform Nash
equilibria exist; see Fig. 4.
A similar example was recently suggested in [1]; see the last diagram there.
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Fig. 4. Nash equilibria exist for all initial positions but depend on them.
5. Proof of Theorems 1 and 3
5.1. Uniformly non-solvable subgames
Remembering Theorem 2, we will restrict ourselves to the zero-sum ±1 payoffs. Then, given a game (−→G , P, j, u), the
maxmin v1(j) andminmax v2(j) take only values±1, too. Since v1(j) ≤ v2(j) for all j ∈ V , pairs (v1(j), v2(j)) can take only
three pairs of values: (−1,−1), (1, 1), and (−1, 1) that define the partition V = V−∪V+∪V±. Let us consider three induced
subgraphs
−→
G − = −→G [V−],−→G + = −→G [V+],−→G± = −→G [V±] and three partitions P−, P+, P± induced on sets V−, V+, V± by the
original partition P : V = V1 ∪ V2.
For zero-sum±1 games we can reformulate Theorem 7 as follows.
Lemma 2. Digraphs
−→
G − = −→G [V−],−→G + = −→G [V+], and−→G± = −→G [V±] have no dead-ends. Furthermore,
player 1 has no moves from V− to V± ∪ V+ and from V− ∪ V± to V+, while
player 2 has no moves from V+ to V± ∪ V− and from V+ ∪ V± to V−. 
In other words, in the sequence V−, V±, V+ player 1 can move only from right to left, while player 2 only from left to
right, and each player can always stay in the same set.
These observations easily imply that triplets (
−→
G −, P−, j), (
−→
G +, P+, j), and (
−→
G±, P±, j) form cycle game forms when the
initial position j belongs to V−, V+, and V±, respectively.
Lemma 3. The pair (
−→
G±, P±) is uniformly non-solvable.
Proof. By definition, −1 = v1(j) < v2(j) = 1 for all j ∈ V± in the considered game (−→G , P, j, u). Hence, the subgame
(
−→
G±, P±, j, u±) is ±-solvable for no j ∈ V±, where u± is the restriction of u to C(−→G±); in other words, pair (−→G±, P±) is
uniformly non-solvable. 
This lemma can be equivalently reformulated as follows.
Corollary 5. A pair (
−→
G , P) is either solvable (for all j and u), or it contains a uniformly non-solvable induced subpair. 
5.2. Extending uniformly non-solvable subgames
Lemma 4. Let us extend a uniformly non-solvable pair (
−→
G , P) by adding a new arc e = (j′, j′′) to digraph −→G = (V ,−→E ) such
that j′, j′′ ∈ V . Then the obtained pair (−→G′ , P) is uniformly non-solvable too.
Proof. Let us assume w.l.o.g. that position j′ is controlled by player 1, that is, j′ ∈ V1.
Let us fix a payoff u such that for every j ∈ V the obtained game (−→G , P, j, u) is not solvable, that is,−1=v1(j)<v2(j)=1
for all j ∈ V . Then, let us extend this payoff u to a new payoff u′ for the pair (−→G′ , P) by setting u(c) = −1 whenever c is a
new dicycle, that is, c contains the new arc e.
Let v′(j) and v′′(j) denote maxmin and minmax in the obtained game (
−→
G′ , P, j, u′).
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Fig. 5. Uniformly non-solvable pair.
Obviously, v′2(j) = v2(j) = 1 for each j ∈ V , since in the extended game player 2 got no new strategies. Yet, we have to
show that v′1(j) = v1(j) = −1 for all j ∈ V .
It is clear that v′1(j′′) = −1. Indeed, beginning from j′′ a play results in−1 whenever player 1 chooses move e = (j′, j′′).
Hence, (s)he has no reason to do so and can be restricted to the old strategies, as well.
Let us assume indirectly that v′1(j0) = 1 for some j0 ∈ V and let x1 be a strategy that guarantees this result. Obviously, x1
must choose (j′, j′′) in j′, since otherwise the same strategy would guarantee v1(j0) = 1 in the old game, as well.
If, playing against x1 player 2 cannot reach j′ from j0 then the choice of x1 in j′ is irrelevant and player 1 might replace x1
by x′1 choosing in j′ a move distinct from e and still win in the old game. Hence, v1(j0) = 1 and we obtain a contradiction.
Let us assume that player 2 can reach j′ from j0 by a simple path p(x1, x2, j0). We know that player 1 proceeds with
the move (j′, j′′) and also that v′1(j′′) = −1. Hence, player 2, playing against x1, can reach from j′′ a dicycle c such that
u(1, c) = −1 by a simple path p(x1, x2, j′′). Even if this path meets p(x1, x2, j0) before it reaches c , still the obtained
dicycle c ′ contains e and hence, u′(1, c ′) = −1. In both cases player 2 wins, that is, v′1(j0) = −1 in contradiction with
our assumption. 
Lemma 5. Let us extend a uniformly non-solvable pair (
−→
G , P) by adding a new arc e = (j′, j′′) to digraph −→G = (V ,−→E ) such
that j′′ ∈ V , while j′ ∉ V . Then the obtained pair (−→G′ , P) is uniformly non-solvable too.
Proof. Indeed, pair (
−→
G , P) is uniformly non-solvable by assumption and there is only one move in j′. 
5.3. Proof of Theorem 1
Let us consider the pair (
−→
G′ , P ′) and its subpair (G, P), as in the statement of Theorem 1.
Since game form (
−→
G , P, j0) is not solvable, there is a payoff u such that game (
−→
G , P, j0, u) is not solvable. Then, by
Lemma 3, we obtain a uniformly the non-solvable pair (
−→
G±, P±), which contains j0, by definition.
Step A1. Let us add to
−→
G± the arcs (j′, j′′) ∈ −→E ′ \−→E± such that j′, j′′ ∈ V± one by one. The obtained pair (−→G1, P1) is uniformly
non-solvable, by Lemma 4.
Step A2. By condition (iii) of the theorem, since j0 ∈ V±, there is an arc (j′, j′′) in−→E ′ such that j′′ ∈ V±, while j′ ∉ V±. Let us
add such an arc (togetherwith vertex j′) to
−→
G1. Obviously, the obtained pair (
−→
G2, P2) is uniformly non-solvable, by Lemma 5.
Step A3. Now let us add to digraph
−→
G2 all arcs (j, j′) ∈ −→E ′ , where j ∈ V±. By Lemma 4, the obtained pair (−→G3, P3) is uniformly
non-solvable.
Then, let us repeat all steps until we obtain the final digraph
−→
G′ and conclude that pair (
−→
G′ , P ′) is uniformly non-
solvable. 
5.4. Examples of (uniform) non-solvability
Example 1. As an illustration, let us consider four pairs (
−→
Gk, Pk), k ≤ 4, in Fig. 1. The first and the last pairs are uniformly
non-solvable; (
−→
G3, P3) is uniformly solvable; finally, (
−→
G2, P2) is not solvable, yet, not uniformly. Let us notice that (
−→
G1, P1) <
(
−→
G2, P2) < (
−→
G3, P3).
This example shows that condition (iii) of Theorem 1 is essential. Indeed, both extensions (
−→
G1, P1) to (
−→
G2, P2) and
(
−→
G2, P2) to (
−→
G3, P3) satisfy (i) and (ii) but (iii) fails.
Let us also note that the first pair is symmetric, while the other three are not.
Example 2. The simplest (symmetric) uniformly non-solvable pair is given in Fig. 1(1).
Another (not symmetric) example, with the same 2×2 normal form, is given in Fig. 5. Here p′i, p′′i , and pi, for i = 1, 2, are
directed paths. It is essential that positions j1 and j2 are controlled by distinct players; all other positions can be assigned
arbitrarily.
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Let us also notice that ‘‘topology’’ is not essential. Whatmatters is that, first, one player has an alternative, then the other.
In this sense, the two examples above are equivalent.
These two (and many other equivalent) constructions are instrumental in proofs of non-solvability; see Section 11 and
also [4] or Section 7 of [8].
Example 3. Now, let us recall four pairs on Fig. 2. As we already know, the last two are solvable, while the first two are not.
Since the considered four graphs are symmetric and connected, both solvability and non-solvability are uniform for these
examples. Yet, let us repeat that the set of Nash equilibria or even the value, in the zero-sum case, might depend on the
initial position; see [8] Appendix 2 for more details.
5.5. Proof of Theorem 3
We will derive Theorem 3 from Theorem 1. Again, we prove a slightly stronger claim.
Given k digraphs
−→
Gℓ = (Vℓ,−→Eℓ ), ℓ ∈ [k] = {1, . . . , k} that are pairwise disjoint, except for a unique common vertex j0,
that is, Vℓ∩Vℓ′ = {j0} for each two distinct ℓ, ℓ′ ∈ [k]. Then obviously, their k arc-sets are pairwise disjoint. Let−→G = (V ,−→E )
be the union of these k digraphs, V = ∪kℓ=1 Vℓ and
−→
E = ∪kℓ=1
−→
Eℓ .
Lemma 6. Digraph
−→
G is strongly connected if and only if digraphs
−→
Gℓ are strongly connected for all ℓ ∈ [k].
Proof. Each of the above digraphs is strongly connected if and only if all its vertices can be reached by a directed path from
j0 and j0 can be reached by a directed path from each vertex. Clearly, this property holds for
−→
G if and only if it holds for
−→
Gℓ
for all ℓ ∈ [k]. 
In the rest of this subsection, we assume that digraph
−→
G is strongly connected.
Furthermore, let Pℓ : Vℓ = V ℓ1 ∪ V ℓ2 be k partitions such that the initial position j0 belongs to the same player, i = 1 or
i = 2, in all of them. Let P : V = V1 ∪ V2 be the union of these partitions, that is, V1 = ∪kℓ=1 V ℓ1 and V2 = ∪kℓ=1 V ℓ2 .
Lemma 7. Cycle game form (
−→
G , P, j0) is solvable if and only if (
−→
Gℓ , Pℓ, j0) are solvable for all ℓ ∈ [k].
Proof. Given an arbitrary zero-sum payoff u, the following formulas, obviously, hold
vi = max(vℓi | ℓ ∈ [k]) if j0 ∈ V1 and vi = min(vℓi | ℓ ∈ [k]) if j0 ∈ V2 for i ∈ I = {1, 2},
where vi = vi(−→G , P, j0) and vℓi = vℓi (
−→
Gk, Pk, j0) for ℓ ∈ [k] are maxmin for i = 1 and minmax for i = 2. It is easy to
see that maxmin and minmax are equal for all u in game (
−→
G , P, j0, u) if and only if they are equal for all u in all games
(
−→
Gℓ , Pk, j0, u) for ℓ ∈ [k]. 
Let us recall that, by Corollary 1, solvability is uniform, that is, it does not depend on the initial position. Hence, we can
strengthen Lemma 7 as follows.
Lemma 8. Pair (
−→
G , P) is solvable if the pairs (
−→
Gℓ , Pℓ) are solvable for all ℓ ∈ [k], otherwise pair (−→G , P) is uniformly non-
solvable. 
Thus, we have defined an operation of the union of pairs with a unique common position and proved that the resulting
pair is solvable (and strongly connected) if and only if all involved pairs are solvable (and strongly connected). Obviously,
this operation can be applied several times successively and the same conclusion proved by induction.
Let us apply this construction to the corresponding non-directed graphs and pairs. It is easy to see that each connected
graph can be obtained in this way from its 2-connected components and some edges.
Obviously, a pair corresponding to a single edge is solvable. This and Lemma 8 imply Theorem 3. 
6. More criteria of solvability
By Theorem 3, a pair (G, P) is solvable if and only if all its 2-connected components are solvable.
Thus, studying solvability, w.l.o.g. we can restrict ourselves to 2-connected graphs.
In Section 3.4, to every graph G = (V , E) we assigned a graph G = (V, E, E0, E1) (with the sets of 0- and 1-edges) and
then replaced every 0-edge in G by a pair of parallel edges getting G0.
Obviously, a simple cycle G is a unique 2-connected graph for whichG is a null-graph. In this case a criterion of solvability
is given by Proposition 1: a pair (G, P) is solvable unless it is a 1-cycle.
So in this section, we always assume that G is a 2-connected graph distinct from a simple cycle.
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6.1. Orienting (G0,P )
We will proceed with one more transformation. Let us orient each pair of parallel 0-edges oppositely, all other edges
of G0 arbitrarily, and denote the obtained pair by (
−→
G0 ,P ). Given an initial position j ∈ V and a zero-sum ±1 payoff
u : C(−→G0)→ {−1,+1}, we obtain a game (−→G0 ,P , j, u).
Remark 20. Each pair of oppositely oriented 0-edges form a short 0-cycle c in G0. By definition of a 0-edge, both positions
of c are controlled by the same player i ∈ {1, 2}. We will always assume that u(i, c) = (−1)i, that is, i cannot win on c .
Furthermore, digraph
−→
G0 may have dead-ends. Naturally, we will assume that a player wins whenever the opponent cannot
move.
Modulo these restrictions, the concept of solvability is standardly defined for a quadruple (
−→
G0 ,P , j, u), triplets (
−→
G0 ,P , j),
(
−→
G0 ,P , u), and pair (
−→
G0 ,P ). A pair (
−→
G0 ,P ) is called uniformly non-solvable if there is a payoff u such that the game
(
−→
G0 ,P , j, u) is solvable for no initial position j ∈ V .
The following statement is similar to Proposition 1.
Proposition 7. Given a pair (G,P ), either every orientation (−→G0 ,P ) is solvable or there is a uniformly non-solvable orientation
(
−→
G0
∗,P ) .
Proof. By definition, a pair (−→G0 ,P ) is not solvable if there is a payoff u such that the game (−→G0 ,P , j, u) is not solvable for
some j ∈ V . Let V0 denote the set of all such j. We keep the orientation of an edge (j′, j′′) whenever j′, j′′ ∈ V0. Otherwise,
we redefine the orientations by the following recursion: direct (j′, j′′) from j′ to j′′ whenever j′ ∉ V0, while j′′ ∈ V0 (the only
exception is a pair of 0-edges which must be directed oppositely); define V1 as the union of all such j′ and V0; repeat the
procedure for V1; etc.
Obviously, each dicycle of the obtained digraph
−→
G0
∗ is contained inV0, with the exception for the short 0-cycles. Yet, no
player is interested to form the latter. Thus, pair (
−→
G0
∗,P ) is uniformly non-solvable. 
6.2. Statement and comments
The following criteria will be instrumental in the proof of our main Theorem 4.
Theorem 8. • (i) A pair (G, P) is uniformly non-solvable whenever (G0,P ) contains a 1-edge e = (j′, j′′) and two more edge-
disjoint paths between j′ and j′′.
• (ii) Otherwise, (G, P) is solvable if and only if every orientation (−→G0 ,P ) is solvable.
Let us recall that G is a 2-connected graph distinct from a simple cycle. In the latter case (G, P) is solvable unless G is
a 1-cycle, by Proposition 1. Obviously, part (i) is a generalization of Proposition 5, which treats the case when j′ and j′′ are
controlled by the same player.
Due to Propositions 1 and 7, we can reformulate (ii) as follows:
(ii′) Otherwise, (G, P) is (uniformly) non-solvable if and only if there is a (uniformly) non-solvable orientation (−→G0 ,P ).
Remark 21. Obviously, a game (−→G0 ,P , j0, u) is solvable in the following cases:
• (a) One player, i ∈ {1, 2}, is a dummy, that is, (s)he has only one move in each position j ∈ Vi.
• (b) The initial position j0 is a dead-end in−→G0 . Then the player who begins in j0 will lose.• (c) A dicycle c is fully controlled by a player i ∈ I = {1, 2}, who wins on it, u(i, c) = (−1)i−1, and j0 belongs to c . Then i
begins in j0 ∈ c and wins.• (d) In particular, we obtain such a dicycle c when we replace a 0-edge of G by two oppositely oriented edges. Obviously,
player i begins in j0 and wins unless u(i, c) = (−1)i.
Hence, all the above orientations and payoffs should be ignored whenever we verify uniform non-solvability.
6.3. Notation and auxiliary claims
Let us consider (2-connected) pairs (G, P) and (G,P ), fix an edge e of G and the corresponding simple path Q , of a length
k, between two nodes j0 and jk in G; and introduce the following standard notation:
Q = Qk = (V , E), where V = {j0, j1, . . . , jk} and E = {(jℓ−1, jℓ) | ℓ ∈ [k] = {1, . . . , k}}.
Let us recall that, except for j0 and jk, path Q contains no other nodes (vertex of degree at least 3) of G. The corresponding
digraph
−→
Q = (V ,−→E ) consists of k short dicycles, Ck = {cℓ = ((jℓ−1, jℓ), (jℓ, jℓ−1)) | ℓ ∈ [k]} that are in one-to-one
correspondence with E. Let u : Ck → {0, 1} be a payoff restricted to these dicycles.
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Let the player i, who controls j0, enter Q from j0. There are three options:
(j) this player iwins, (jj) the opponent 3− iwins, and (jjj) a draw, that is, none of the two players wins.
In the last case, the play will pass Q from j0 to jk and then leave Q from jk.
In Section 7 we will show that
• (x) there is a unique payoff uL : Ck → {0, 1} that results in a draw;
• (y) by symmetry, there is a unique payoff uR such that the optimal play passes Q from jk to j0, then leaves Q from j0, and
no player wins;
• (z) the above two payoffs coincide, uL = uR, if and only if Q is a 0-path.
6.4. A plan of the proof
The above claims easily imply the ‘‘only if part’’ of Theorem 8(ii′). Indeed, let (−→G0 ,P , u0) be a uniformly non-solvable
triplet. Then, pair (G, P) is uniformly non-solvable too. The corresponding payoff u : C(−→G0 ) → {0, 1} is naturally given
as follows: for the short dicycles (edges of G) the payoffs are uniquely defined as uL or uR for the corresponding e ∈ Q , in
accordance with the orientation
−→
G0 ; for the remaining (long) dicycles of C(
−→
G0 ) the payoffs are induced by u0. 
However, (i) and the ‘‘if part’’ of (ii) appear more difficult, due to the following ‘‘1-path phenomenon’’.
Let j0 and jk be controlled by the same player, say 1, and player 2 wins whenever 1 enters Q , from j0 or from jk. Yet,
the corresponding two winning strategies xL2 and x
R
2 may differ. In the next section we will show that there is a uniformly
winning strategy x2 = xL2 = xR2 unless Q is a 1-path (that is, player 2 controls only one position of Q ). In the latter case, the
criterion of solvability is given by Theorem 8(i), which will be proven in Section 9, together with the ‘‘if part’’ of (ii). In the
next section, it will be also shown that 1-cycles are uniformly non-solvable, due to the same 1-path phenomenon.
7. Passing through simple paths and cycles
Here we will prove claims (x, y, z) of Section 6.3 and also derive from them Proposition 1.
7.1. Uniformly winning strategies for simple paths
Let us proceed with a proof of the 1-path phenomenon defined in the last subsection.
Proposition 8. For a 1-path Q there are exactly two payoffs such that no uniformly winning strategies exist; otherwise, for a
regular path Q , such a strategy x2 = xL2 = xR2 exists.
Proof. Clearly, winning strategies xL2 and x
R
2 instruct player 2 as follows: go to the right (left) until a position jL (respectively,
jR) appears; then turn left (right) to win in one move.
By assumption, positions j0 and jk areWhite (controlled by player 1), while jL and jR are Black. Yet, jL and jR might coincide.
The following case analysis proves the proposition.
Case jL ≠ jR. Then, let us define x2 as follows: being between jR and jL, play arbitrarily, otherwise apply xL2 between j0 and
jR and xR2 between jL and jk.
Remark 22. It might be convenient, to partition this case into two: jL is strictly to the left or to the right from jR. Yet, strategy
x2 can be defined similarly, as above, in both subcases.
The remaining case, jL = jR, can be partitioned into two subcases E0 and E1 as follows.
E0: path Q is regular, that is, except for j = jL = jR, there is at least one more Black position j′ in Q . By assumption, j′ is
distinct from j0 and jk. If j′ is to the left (right) from j then, obviously, xL2 (respectively, x
R
2) prescribes to go right (left) from j
′.
In this case, x2 is defined as the next rule: apply xR2 (respectively, x
L
2) being strictly to the right (left) from j and x
L
2 otherwise.
E1: path Q is a 1-path, that is, j = jL = jR is a unique Black position in Q .
In this case, let us consider the next two payoff functions: u′ (respectively, u′′): player 2 wins in all short dicycles of Q
(respectively, in all but two, incident to position j).
We will assume that none of the two players wins when the play passes through Q , from j0 to jk or conversely. It is
convenient to define the game as a draw in both cases.
Let us add to Q loop cL = (j0, j0) at j0 or cR = (jk, jk) at jk and denote the obtained extended graphs by QR and QL,
respectively. In both cases let us set u(cL) = u(cR) = 0 and consider two pairs of games (QR, P, j0, u) and (QL, P, jk, u),
where u = u′ or u = u′′.
If u = u′ (respectively, u = u′′) then player 2, Black, can win (make a draw) in both games of the pair, yet, there is no
uniformly winning strategy. If the guess of the entrance position, j0 or jk, is wrong then player 2 makes a draw (lose). Except
u′ and u′′ there are no other ‘‘ambiguous’’ payoff functions. 
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7.2. On solvability of simple cycles; proof of Proposition 1
The above analysis implies Proposition 1. Let us identify two (White) vertices j0 and jk of Qk and obtain a simple cycle
Ck. The corresponding digraph
−→
Ck contains k short dicycles Ck = {cℓ | ℓ ∈ [k]} and two long dicycles, clockwise
cR and counterclockwise cL. Now we have to extend the zero-sum ±1 payoff to these two dicycles, rather than setting
u(cL) = u(cR) = 0.
A game form (Ck, P, j0) is solvable whenever it is regular, that is, players 1 and 2 control at least two positions each.
Indeed, either player 1 can start, clockwise or counterclockwise, and win, or player 2 can win in both cases. Yet, then (s)he
wins uniformly, unless V1 = 1 or V2 = 1, that is, unless Ck is a 1-cycle.
Of course, 0-cycles are solvable too but 1-cycles are not.
The simplest not solvable pair is (C2, P) in Fig. 1. Graph C2 consists of two vertices and two edges; players 1 and 2 control
one position each. The corresponding pair (
−→
C2 , P) is given in Fig. 1(1). Digraph
−→
C2 contains four dicycles. Each player has
two strategies. Thus, all four outcomes of the corresponding 2× 2 normal game form are distinct and it is not solvable.
More generally, let (Ck, P) be a 1-cycle, say, V1 = {j0}, V2 = V \ {j0}, and |V | = k ≥ 2. We will show that (C2, P) is not
solvable. The corresponding digraph
−→
C2 contains 2k + 2 dicycles: k short, of length 2 each, and two long, of length k each,
clockwise cL and counter-clockwise cR, respectively. Let us consider a payoff u defined as follows: u(c) = −1 if dicycle c is
long and u(c) = +1 if c is short. Player 1 controls only the initial position j0 and has two strategies: to begin clockwise or
counter-clockwise. Player 2 has 2k−1 strategies, yet, all of them, but two, are definitely losing, since they always result in a
short cycle. (Recall that player 2 is theminimizer.) Only two strategies, the clockwise and counter-clockwise, can bewinning.
Yet, even in this case, there is no guarantee. Each of these strategies of player 2 wins only if player 1 begins correspondingly.
Then two long cycles appear; otherwise (if player 1 begins clockwise and 2 proceeds counter-clockwise, or vice versa) a
short cycle appears and player 1 wins. Thus, removing all dominated strategies of player 2, we reduce the original normal
form to the 2× 2 matrix with a1,1 = a2,2 = +1 and a1,2 = a2,1 = −1, which has no saddle point in pure strategies.
Remark 23. It is important to recall here that both players are restricted to their positional strategies, that is, the move in
a position can depend only on this position but not on the preceding positions or moves. By this assumption, player 2 is not
aware of the move of player 1 in j0. In other words, both players choose their (positional) strategies simultaneously.
7.3. Two special zero-sum±1 payoffs assigned to a simple path
Given a simple path Qk of length k, defined in Section 6.3.
Lemma 9. (i, ii) There is a unique payoff uL (respectively, uR) such that the obtained game (QL, P, j0, uL) (respectively,
(QR, P, jk, uR)) is a draw, that is, it results in cL (respectively, in cR). Payoffs uL and uR are defined respectively by the following
equations:
uL(cℓ) = (−1)i whenever jℓ ∈ Vi, where i ∈ I = {1, 2} and ℓ ∈ [k] = {1, . . . , k} (6)
uR(cℓ) = (−1)i whenever jℓ−1 ∈ Vi, where i ∈ I = {1, 2} and ℓ− 1 ∈ [k] = {1, . . . , k}. (7)
(iii) There is a payoff u = uL = uR satisfying both (6) and (7) if and only if
(a) V1 = V , V2 = ∅, u(cℓ) = −1 ∀ ℓ ∈ [k] or (b) V2 = V , V1 = ∅. u(cℓ) = +1 ∀ ℓ ∈ [k].
In both cases, the pairs (QL, P) and (QR, P) form 0-paths.
Proof. At first, let us consider (i) and (ii). Obviously, (QL, P, j0, uL) (and respectively, (QR, P, jK , uR)) is a positional gamewith
perfect information whose tree is a caterpillar. Indeed, in each position jℓ ∈ Vi player i has two options: either to return to
jℓ−1 (respectively, to jℓ+1) and, by this, to finish the game in cℓ (respectively, in cℓ+1), or to proceed with jℓ+1 (respectively,
with jℓ−1). It is also easy to see that the first option is winning whenever (6) (respectively, (7)) does not hold. Thus, the play
results in cL (respectively, in cR), and the game results in a draw, if and only if (6) (respectively, (7)) holds for all ℓ.
Now, let us proceed with (iii) and notice that in both cases (a) and (b) equations (6) and (7) hold and, moreover,
uL(cℓ) = uR(cℓ) for ℓ ∈ [k].
Equations (6), (7), and uL(ck) = uR(ck) for all ℓ ∈ [k] imply that
uL(c1) = uR(c2) = uL(c2) = uR(c3) = · · · = uL(cℓ−1) = uR(cℓ) = · · · = uL(ck−1) = uR(ck).
Hence, (6) and (7) imply that all positions j0, j1, . . . , jk are controlled by the same player i ∈ I = {1, 2} and, moreover,
that uL(ck) = uR(ck) = u(ck) = (−1)i for all ℓ ∈ [k].
It is easily seen that cases (a) and (b) in (iii) appear for i = 1 and i = 2, respectively. 
Remark 24. If j0 = jk then path Q turns into a simple cycle C . Obviously, Lemma 9 can be extended to this case without any
changes.
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Fig. 6. Lemma 10 in case ofm = 1.
A B
Fig. 7. Uniform non-solvability in presence of a 1-path.
8. Uniform non-solvability in the presence of 1-paths
8.1. θ-edges; definition and characterization
Let us consider a graph G = (V , E) and the corresponding graph G = (V, E) defined in Section 3.4.
An edge e = (j′, j′′) ∈ E will be called a θ-edge if G contains two edge-disjoint paths between j′ and j′′, in addition to e.
For example, in graphs θk from Fig. 3, the solid lines are θ-edges, while the dotted lines are not.
Lemma 10. Let us replace an edge e ∈ E by two oppositely directed edges e′ = (j′, j′′) and e′′ = (j′′, j′).
The remaining edges of G can be orientated so that two simple dicycles c ′ and c ′′ passing, respectively, through e′ and e′′ appear
if and only if e is a θ-edge.
Moreover, if e is a θ-edge then there exist c ′ and c ′′ without common edges, except e.
Proof. The ‘‘if part’’ is obvious. Let us orient two edge-disjoint paths, one from j′ to j′′, while the other from j′′ to j′. Then two
promised edge-disjoint simple dicycles c ′ and c ′′ oppositely oriented on e appear.
The ‘‘only if part’’ is just a bit more difficult. Let us start with e′ and follow c ′. The common arcs with c ′′ form m vertex-
disjoint dipaths. (By convention, e′ and e′′ does not count.)
Ifm = 0 then c ′ \ {e′} and c ′′ \ {e′′} form two edge-disjoint dipaths Q ′ and Q ′′ between j′ and j′′.
Case m = 1 is shown in Fig. 6. Obviously, after elimination of the unique common dipath, one gets two edge-disjoint
paths p′ and p′′ between j′ and j′′. (However, let us notice that orientations of c ′ and c ′′ induce no orientations of p′ and p′′;
see Fig. 6). In general, for an arbitrarym, we also get two such paths eliminating allm common dipaths of c ′ and c ′′, as well
as all cycles between them. 
8.2. θ-1-edges and -paths
Let us consider a pair (G, P) and the corresponding pair (G,P ) defined in Section 3.4.
An edge e = (j′, j′′) ∈ E is called a θ-1-edge if it is a θ-edge of G and 1-edge of (G,P ), simultaneously.
The simple path Q in G, assigned to e, is called a θ-path, 1-path, or θ-1-path whenever e has the corresponding property.
Obviously, Theorem 8(i) can be reformulated as follows.
Proposition 9. A pair (G, P) is uniformly not solvable whenever (G0,P ) contains a θ-1-edge.
8.3. Two uniformly non-solvable examples with θ-1-paths
As we know, a 1-cycle (G, P) is uniformly non-solvable. Now, let us consider a pair (G, P) whose graph G consists of a
1-path Q of length k and two more paths Q ′ and Q ′′ between j0 and jk. Two examples, (A) and (B), with k = 3, are given in
Fig. 7. In these examples, Q ′,Q ′′ and Q are pairwise vertex-disjoint; more precisely, they have no common vertices, except
for the common ends j0 and jk. Let j0, j1, . . . , jk denote the k+1 vertices ofQ and let jℓ0 be a unique vertex of player 1 (White)
among them. We say that path Q is of type A if 0 < ℓ0 < k and B if ℓ0 = 0 or ℓ0 = k; see Fig. 7.
Let us introduce a payoff u as follows. For the short dicycles of Q ′ and Q ′′ it is defined in a (unique) way, so that Q ′ and
Q ′′ are passed clockwise; see Section 7.3. Let player 1 win in the obtained long dicycle. Moreover, let 1 also win, u(cℓ) = +1,
in all short dicycles cℓ, ℓ ∈ [k] = {1, . . . , k} of path Q . Then, in accordance with Section 7.2, path Q might be passed
E. Boros et al. / Discrete Applied Mathematics 159 (2011) 1461–1487 1479
through both ways. Respectively, two more clockwise long dicycles c ′ and c ′′, formed by (Q ′,Q ) and (Q ′′,Q ), appear. We
set u(c ′) = u(c ′′) = −1, that is, player 2 wins in both cases. Let us consider two examples, of types (A) and (B), in Fig. 7.
(A) ℓ0 = 2.A play can come to position j2 in twoways: from the left (j1) or right (j3). In both cases player 1 (White) couldwin.
Indeed, it is enough just to return from j2 to the position from which the play came from, since u(c2) = u(c3) = +1. Yet, he
cannot guarantee the victory. Indeed, by our basic assumption, the players are restricted to their positional strategies and
the move in j2 cannot depend on where the play came to j2 from. Thus, player 2 should not surrender. Instead, she should
try to enter Q either from j0 or from j3 and then approach j2. Although, in both cases the opponent could win, yet, if his guess
is wrong then a long dicycle, c ′ or c ′′, appears and in both cases 2 wins, since u(c ′) = u(c ′′) = −1.
(B) ℓ0 = 3. Again, the play may come to position jℓ0 = j3 in two ways: from j2 or by Q ′. Respectively, player 1 should return
to j2 or switch to Q ′′. In both cases he wins, since u(c) = u(c3) = +1. Yet, again he cannot guarantee the victory being
unaware of the opponent strategy. Hence, player 2 should not surrender. Instead, in position j0 she can try either to enter
(and then pass through) path Q or switch to Q ′. Although, player 1 can win in both cases, yet, if his guess is wrong then a
long dicycle c ′ or c ′′ appears and player 2 wins, since u(c ′) = u(c ′′) = −1.
Clearly, both games are uniformly not solvable. These two examples are generalized in the next section.
9. Proof of Theorem 8
Claim (i). Given a θ-1-edge in (G0,P ), let us consider the corresponding three paths Q ,Q ′,Q ′′ between j′ and j′′ in (G0, P)
such that Q and Q ′ (respectively, Q and Q ′′) form a simple cycle c ′ (respectively, c ′′).
Let us recall that (G0,P ) is obtained from (G,P ) by duplicating all 0-edges of the latter; respectively, (G0, P) is obtained
from (G, P) by duplicating the corresponding 0-paths.
Lemma 11. For the subgraph Q ′ ∪ Q ′′ of G0, exactly one of the next two statements holds:
(X) Q ′ ∪ Q ′′ contains two paths p′ and p′′ between j′ and j′′ that have no other common vertices;
(Y) there is a vertex j∗ that belongs to all paths between j′ and j′′ in Q ′ ∪ Q ′′.
Proof. This is a special case of the classical Menger [41] theorem; one-vertex cut case. 
For an integer k ≥ 0 let us define a k-sausage graph Sk as follows:
Sk contains the vertex-set J = {j′, j′′; j1, . . . , jk}, and maybe some other vertices;
Sk consists of 2k+ 2 simple paths p′ℓ and p′′ℓ between jℓ−1 and jℓ for ℓ ∈ [k+ 1] = {1, . . . , k+ 1}, where by convention,
we set j0 = j′ and jk+1 = j′′;
these two paths have exactly two common vertices jℓ−1 and jℓ and contain no other vertices of J;
any other two paths contain at most one common vertex, which (if any) belongs to J .
Claim (X) of Lemma 11 means exactly that Q ′ ∪ Q ′′ contains a 0-sausage S0.
Applying Lemma 11 successively, we obtain the following result.
Corollary 6. Graph Q ′ ∪ Q ′′ contains a k-sausage Sk for an integer k ≥ 0. 
Hence, graph H = Q ∪ Q ′ ∪ Q ′′ contains a subgraph H ′ = Q ∪ Sk. Let us recall that, in its turn, H is a subgraph of G0
and also that Q and Sk contain only two common vertices j′ and j′′. We want to prove that (G, P) is uniformly non-solvable.
By Corollary 2, it is enough to show that pair (H ′, P ′) is non-solvable, where P ′ is a restriction of P from G to H ′. We will
consider two cases: k = 0 and k > 0.
If k = 0, we can just repeat the analysis of examples (A) and (B) from the previous section.
Just one more special case to consider: Q is a 1-path and Q ′ = Q ′′ is a 0-path. Obviously, in this case (G, P) is uniformly
non-solvable, since it contains a 1-cycle (H ′, P ′) formed by Q and Q ′ = Q ′′.
For k ≥ 1 we consider two subcases. First, assume that all vertices of J = {j′ = j0, j1, . . . , jk, jk+1 = j′′} are
monochromatic, say Black (that is, they are controlled by player 2, the minimizer).
Remark 25. This is a special ‘‘monochromatic’’ subcase treated by the ‘‘unless part’’ of Proposition 5.
Our arguments for Example (A) can be adapted to this subcase. Let us define a payoff u : C(Q ∪ Sk)→ {0, 1} as follows:
all short dicycles of Q are winning for player 1 and p′ℓ (respectively, p
′′
ℓ ) should be passed through in the direction from jℓ−1
to jℓ (respectively, from jℓ to jℓ−1), for all ℓ ∈ J .
Remark 26. Let us notice that paths p′ℓ and p
′′
ℓ are always passed through in two opposite directions. In particular, theymay
correspond to a 0-path.
1480 E. Boros et al. / Discrete Applied Mathematics 159 (2011) 1461–1487
Let us denote by p′ and p′′ two obtained directed paths from j′ to j′′ and from j′′ to j′, respectively.
Payoff u for the long dicycles is as follows: u(c ′) = u(c ′′) = −1 for dicycles c ′ and c ′′ formed by (Q , p′) and (Q , p′′),
respectively; u(cℓ) = 1 for every dicycle cℓ formed by p′ℓ and p′′ℓ for ℓ ∈ J .
Now we can repeat the arguments of Section 8.3, Example (A), showing that each of two players has only two good
strategies that form a 2 × 2 saddle point free matrix, since u(x′1, x′2) = u(x′′1, x′′2) = 1, while u(x′1, x′′2) = u(x′′1, x′2) = 0.
Hence, pair (G, P) is uniformly non-solvable.
Now, let us consider the second subcase: k ≥ 1 and J is not monochromatic, that is, there are jℓ′ , jℓ′′ ∈ J controlled by
players 1 and 2, respectively. In this case, one can trivially obtain a uniformly non-solvable orientation, as in Example 2; see
Fig. 5.
There is a small problem, yet. If for an ℓ ∈ [k+ 1] the paths p′ℓ, p′′ℓ of Sk correspond to a 0-path from Q ′ ∪ Q ′′ then p′ℓ and
p′′ℓ must be directed oppositely, while Example 2 requires their parallel orientation.
To resolve this problem, let us notice that jℓ−1 and jℓ are controlled by the same player, since they form a 0-edge of G.
Hence, we can just replace jℓ−1 by jℓ, or vice versa, and repeat until we get rid of all 0-paths, still keeping two positions of
distinct colors, as in Fig. 5.
More precisely, let us first contract all such 0-pairs in Sk. Doing so, we identify some pairs of vertices of the same color in
J . As a result, all 0-pairs disappear, while all non-monochromatic pairs jℓ−1, jℓ remain.
If we are left with only one such pair j′, j′′ then the arguments of Example (B) work; otherwise we obtain a non-solvable
orientation, as in Example 2. 
‘‘If part’’ of claim (ii). Given a uniformly non-solvable triplet (G, P, u), we have to construct a non-solvable orientation
−→
G0 .
First, let us consider a 0-edge e in (G,P ) and the corresponding 0-path Q in (G, P). If Q is controlled by a player i ∈ {1, 2}
then i must lose, u(i, c) = (−1)i, for every short dicycle c of Q . Indeed, otherwise game (G, P, j, u) would be solvable, at
least for some j from Q . Respectively, we replace each 0-edge of (G,P ) by a pair of oppositely oriented arcs, getting (G0,P ).
Then, let us consider a regular edge e in (G,P ) and the corresponding regular path Q in (G, P). As shown in Section 7, in
this case there are exactly two payoffs uL and uR : C(Q ) → {0, 1} that correspond to two orientations of e (and uL = uR if
and only if Q is a 0-path). For any payoff u : C(G0)→ {0, 1}, whose restriction uQ to Q is distinct from uL and uR, the game
(G, P, j, u) is solvable, at least for some j from Q . Respectively, we orient each regular edge of (G,P ) in accordance with the
given payoff u.
Finally, let us consider a 1-edge e in (G,P ) and the corresponding 1-pathQ in (G, P). By assumption of Theorem8(ii),Q is
not a θ-path. Then, by Lemma 10, one orientation of e belongs to no dicycle of G0. In other words, every dipath following this
orientation comes to a dead-end. Hence, uQ must correspond to the opposite orientation of e; otherwise game (G, P, j, u)
would be solvable, at least for some j from Q .
Thus, we obtain an orientation (
−→
G0 ,P ) corresponding to the given triplet (G, P, u). The latter is uniformly non-solvable,
by assumption. Hence, the former is uniformly non-solvable, too. 
‘‘Only if part’’ of claim (ii). We can just repeat our arguments of Section 6.4; all auxiliary statements being proved in
Section 7. 
10. ‘‘If part’’ of Theorem 4; proof of Propositions 2–5
Let us notice that criterion of solvability for a monochromatic pair, Proposition 5, results immediately from Theorem 8.
Indeed, any orientation of amonochromatic pair (
−→
G0 ,P ) is trivially solvable. Thus, (G, P) is solvable if and only if it contains
no θ-1-path.
Wewill derive the remaining Propositions 2–4 from Theorem 8, as well. First, we look for a θ-1-path in (G, P) and then, if
there are no such paths,we look for a uniformly non-solvable orientation of (
−→
G0 ,P ). Doing so,we can ignore the orientations
listed in Remark 21.
10.1. Pairs (θk,Pk); proof of Proposition 2
Let us consider a bipartite pair (θk,Pk) for an integer k ≥ 1 in Fig. 3 and redraw it with more detail and notation,
as in Fig. 8. The bipartite graph θk = (Vk, Ek) contains 2k vertices (positions) and 3k edges (moves). The vertex-set
Vk = {j1ℓ, j2ℓ | ℓ ∈ [k] = {1, . . . , k}} is partitioned into two subsets: Pk : Vk = V k1 ∪ V k2 , where V ki = {jiℓ | ℓ ∈ [k]}
are k positions of player i ∈ I = {1, 2}: White and Black, respectively. The edge-set Ek = {eℓ, e′ℓ, e′′ℓ | ℓ ∈ [k]} consists of
3k edges: k of type 1, eℓ = (j1ℓ, j2ℓ), and 2k of type 2, e′ℓ = (j2ℓ, j1ℓ+1)′, e′′ℓ = (j2ℓ, j1ℓ+1)′′, where ℓ ∈ [k] and k + 1 = 1, by
convention.
Obviously, an edge of type 2 is a θ-edge,while an edge of type 1 is notwhenever k ≥ 2. Case k = 1 is ‘‘slightly degenerate’’:
θ1 consists of three parallel edges. Clearly, all three are θ-edges.
Let us also note that θk is a subgraph of θk+1; moreover, (θk+1,Pk+1) > (θk,Pk) for each k ≥ 1 and, hence, pairs (θk,Pk)
form an infinite chain of solvable 2-connected pairs with nomaximal element. Finally, since pairs (θk,Pk) are bipartite, they
cannot contain 0-edges; hence, θk = (θk)0.
By Theorem 8(i), a pair (θk,Pk) is uniformly non-solvable whenever it contains a θ-1-edge, or in other words, a θ-1-edge
of type 2. Let us recall that all three edges of θ1 are θ-edges.
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Fig. 8. Pair (θk,Pk).
We have to show that otherwise (in absence of θ-1-edges) (θk,Pk) is solvable. By Theorem 8(ii), Proposition 7, and
equality θk = (θk)0, it is sufficient to demonstrate (indirectly) that there is no uniformly non-solvable orientation of (θk,Pk).
First, let us show that all edges of type 1 are directed similarly: either all clockwise, or all counter-clockwise; see Fig. 8.
Assume indirectly that eℓ′ and eℓ′′ are oppositely oriented. It is easily seen that the game is solvable whenever its initial
position is between the ends of these two edges. Let us assume w.l.o.g. that all edges of type 1 are oriented clockwise.
Second, let us notice that no two parallel edges of type 2 are oriented counter-clockwise; since in this case their common
end is a dead-end.
Hence, any two parallel edges of type 2 are oriented either oppositely, or both clockwise. In the first case they form a
long cycle c . If u(c) = 1 then player 1 wins whenever the initial position is in c; see Fig. 8. If u(c) = −1 then we contract c
and uniform non-solvability still holds.
Applying such contractions successively, we reduce pair (
−→
θk ,Pk) to (
−→
θm,Pm), wherem ≤ k and all edges of the reduced
pair are directed clockwise. Still, it cannot be uniformly non-solvable, because player 1 is a dummy in it (his move in every
position is forced). There are 2m long dicycles; if at least one of them is winning for player 2 she wins, otherwise player 1
wins; yet, in both cases the orientation is (uniformly) solvable and we obtain a contradiction. 
10.2. Pairs (K4,P ′) and (K4,P ′′); proof of Proposition 3
We will prove that each of these two pairs is solvable unless it contains a 0- or 1-edge.
For brevity we represent both pairs by one (K4,P ) in which j1 is an uncertain position, as in Fig. 9.
First, let us suppose that there are no 0- and 1-edges and show that all orientations (
−→
K4,P ) are solvable. Assume
indirectly that there is a (uniformly) not solvable one. Then, it has no-dead-ends or dummy-players. The following simple
case analysis shows that there are only three such orientations, shown in Fig. 9.
Let us demonstrate that the out-degree of each vertex jℓ is 1 or 2. Indeed, if it is 0 then jℓ is a dead-end and if it is 3 then
there are two options: (a) one of the remaining three vertices is a dead-end, or (b) the orientation forms a simple cycle on
these three vertices. Yet, in case (b) the player that controls jℓ has three strategies, while the opponent is a dummy.
Second, each vertex ofK4 is of degree 3. A simple counting shows that there are two vertices, say, j0 and j2, of the out-
degree 2 and in-degree 1, while the remaining two, j1 and j3, are of the out-degree 1 and in-degree 2. Clearly, j0 and j2
cannot belong to the same player, since in this case the opponent would be a dummy. Thus, in (
−→
K4 ,P ) each player has two
strategies. The corresponding orientation and its normal form are given in Fig. 9. Obviously, it is tight and, hence, solvable,
by Theorem 2.
Remark 27. We can ‘‘recolor’’ vertices j1 and j3 and get j1 ∈ V1, while j3 becomes uncertain. However, this transformation
does not change the normal form, since both vertices j1 and j3 are of the out-degree 1, i.e., there is only one (forced) move
in each of these two positions. Assigning a player to each uncertain position we obtain three slightly different pairs; yet, all
three have the same normal form shown in Fig. 9.
Now, let us assume that pair (K4,P ) contains a 1-edge e. We can assume w.l.o.g. that
(a) e = (j0, j2) is of type (A) or (b) e = (j2, j3) is of type (B).
In both cases we obtain a θ-1-edge. Hence, solvability fails, by Theorem 8(i).
Finally, let us suppose that (K4,P ) contains a 0-edge. Obviously, w.l.o.g. we can assume that it is e = (j2, j3). Let us
replace e by two oppositely oriented arcs and direct all other edges as in Fig. 10. It is easy to verify that the corresponding
normal game form does not depend on an initial position and is not tight. This completes the proof of Proposition 3. 
10.3. Pair (K3,3,P ); proof of Proposition 4
We will prove that pair (K3,3,P ) is solvable unless it contains a 1-edge. Clearly, (K3,3,P ) contains no 0-edges, since it
is bipartite. The ‘‘unless part’’ is obvious, because each edge ofK3,3 is a θ-edge. Moreover, for each edge e = (j′, j′′) there
are two more paths between j′ and j′′ that contain no other common vertices. Thus, we can just repeat the arguments of
Section 8.3 for Example (B) in Fig. 7. Due to obvious symmetry, it is enough to verify all the above claims just for one edge.
Now, let us suppose that there are no 1-edges and show that all orientations of (K3,3,P ) are solvable.
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Fig. 9. F1 = c1c2 ∨ c1c3, F2 = c1 ∨ c2c3, F1 = F d2 ; c1 = ((j0, j3), (j3, j1), (j1, j0)), c2 = ((j0, j2), (j2, j1), (j1, j0)), c3 = ((j0, j2), (j2, j3), (j3, j1), (j1, j0)).
Fig. 10. F1 = c0c1c3 ∨ c0c2c4, F2 = c0 ∨ c1c2 ∨ c1c4 ∨ c2c3, F1 ≠ F d2 ; c0 = ((j2, j3), (j3, j2)), c1 = ((j0, j3), (j3, j1), (j1, j0)), c2 = ((j0, j2),
(j2, j1), (j1, j0)), c3 = ((j0, j3), (j3, j2), (j2, j1), (j1, j0)), c4 = ((j0, j2), (j2, j3), (j3, j1), (j1, j0)).
Let us assume indirectly that there is a non-solvable orientation. Then, there is a uniformly non-solvable one. In particular,
it has no dead-ends and no player is a dummy. The following simple case analysis shows that there are only two such
orientations given in Fig. 11.
First, let us show that the out-degree of each vertex jℓ is 1 or 2. Indeed, if it is 0 then jℓ is a dead-end and we get a
contradiction. If it is 3 then jℓ is a transient position. In this case we can reduceK3,3 toK2,3 by deleting jℓ. Also, it is easy to
see that the bipartite pair (K2,3,P ) is, in fact, equivalent to the monochromatic pair (θ1,P ′). By Proposition 5, this pair is
solvable unless it contains a 1-edge.
Second, by simple counting, we show that there are three positions of the out-degree 2 and three of the out-degree 1. If
the first three belong to the same player then the opponent is a dummy. It is easy to verify that, up to an isomorphism, there
are only two dummy-free orientations of K3,3, which are given in Fig. 11 together with the corresponding normal game
forms. Finally, it is easy to verify that both are tight and, hence, solvable, by Theorem 2. 
11. Proof of the ‘‘only if’’ part of Theorem 4 by Lovasz’ ear-decomposition
Thus, a pair (G,P ) is solvable whenever it belongs to the family F defined by Propositions 1–5. Still, we have to prove
that there are no other 2-connected solvable pairs.
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a
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Fig. 11. (a) F1 = c1c2 ∨ c3c4, F2 = c1c3 ∨ c1c4 ∨ c2c3 ∨ c2c4, F1 = F d2 ; c1 = ((j1, j2), (j2, j3), (j3, j4), (j4, j1)), c2 = ((j1, j2), (j2, j5), (j5, j4),
(j4, j1)), c3 = ((j1, j6), (j6, j3), (j3, j4), (j4, j1)), c4 = ((j1, j6), (j6, j5), (j5, j4), (j4, j1)); (b) F1 = c1(c2c3 ∨ c4), F2 = c1 ∨ c2c4 ∨ c3c4, F1 = F d2 ;
c1 = ((j3, j4), (j4, j5), (j5, j6), (j6, j1)), c2 = ((j1, j2), (j2, j3), (j3, j4), (j4, j5), (j5, j6), (j6, j1)), c3 = ((j1, j2), (j2, j5), (j5, j6), (j6, j1)), c4 = ((j1, j4), (j4, j5),
(j5, j6), (j6, j1)).
By Lovasz’ ‘‘Ear-Decomposition’’ Lemma [40], each 2-connected graph Gwhose every vertex is of degree at least 3 can be
obtained from G1 = θ1 by successive addition of new vertices and edges, as follows. By each step k = 1, 2, . . ., we add to a
current graph Gk at most two new vertices and exactly one new edge ek = (j′k, j′′k ). There are the following four options (a),
(b), (c ′) and (c ′′):
(a) j′k and j
′′
k are two ‘‘old’’ vertices of graph Gk;
(b) j′k is an old vertex, while j
′′
k is a new vertex subdividing an edge of Gk;
(c) both j′k and j
′′
k are new vertices subdividing (c
′) an edge or (c ′′) two distinct edges of Gk.
In all cases ek is not a loop, that is, j′ ≠ j′′. This inequality automatically holds for (b) and we assume it for (a) and (c).
Then, after each step, we obtain a 2-connected graph.
This procedure needs only a slight modification to generate all 2-connected pairs (G,P ): let us assign a player, 1 or 2,
to each new vertex, in cases (b) and (c). Applying such assignments and ear-extensions in all possible ways, we will obtain
all pairs, by the Lovasz Lemma. Let us proceed with this algorithm verifying solvability of every obtained new pair. Since,
by Proposition 2, solvability is anti-monotone, we should extend further only solvable pairs and backtrack whenever a non-
solvable one is obtained.
For example, we get the bipartite solvable pair (θk,Pk) from (θ1,P1) by k − 1 successive extensions of type (c ′). The
remaining solvable pairs (K4,P ′), (K4,P ′′), and (K3,3,P ) are also obtained from (θ1,P1) by, respectively, one and two
extensions of type (c ′′).
Remark 28. It would be logical to define θ0 as a special vertex-free loop. Then, we could claim that G = θ0 whenever G is a
simple cycle and also that θ1 is an ear-extension of θ0 of type (c ′′).
We apply the standard depth-first search procedure, backtracking whenever a current ear-extension results in a non-
solvable pair. Indeed, by Proposition 2, no solvable pair can be obtained by extending a non-solvable one. We output the
maximal solvable pairs but also we get all solvable monochromatic pairs and an infinite family of monotone-increasing
chain of solvable pairs (θk,Pk), k = 1, 2, . . ., which does not have a maximum. Thus, the family F is formed.
Our tests of solvability are based on Theorem 8(ii) and (i), which provide sufficient conditions for both solvability and
non-solvability, respectively. The complete case analysis is routine and simple but long and it requires too many diagrams.
To save space, we refer the reader to Section 7 of the research report [8].
Remark 29. In almost all cases, the (uniform) non-solvability of the orientation (−→G ,P ) of a considered ear-extension
follows, because it contains the non-solvable construction of Example 2, see Fig. 5; only in a few cases a 1-cycle of Fig. 2(2)
is needed.
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12. More problems on Nash-solvability of positional game forms in pure positional strategies
12.1. On Nash-solvability of n-person game forms
By Theorem 2 a two-person game form g is Nash-solvable if and only if it is tight; F d1 (g) = F2(g). Both concepts, tightness
and Nash-solvability, are naturally extended to the n-person game forms. Yet, tightness is not necessary and not sufficient
for Nash-solvability when n > 2. For this reason, almost nothing is known about Nash-solvability of n-person game forms
in general and of n-person cycle game forms in particular.
The first example of a tight but notNash-solvable three-person game formwas given in 1975 [26], Remark 3. This example
is of minimum possible size: 2× 2× 4. Another example appeared in [28]; see also [6,4]. It is larger (6× 6× 6) but in a way
simpler, since it is symmetric with respect to all three players.
Yet, Remark 3 of [26] mistakenly claims that tightness remains necessary for Nash-solvability in n-person case. This
mistake was copied in [27] and then pointed out by Danilov [10]; the corresponding 2× 2× 2 example appeared in [28].
A short survey on tightness and Nash-solvability can be found in [4,8]. Let us notice that the proof of Theorem 2 given
there is based on some ideas of [3,11,29] and it differs from the original proof in [26,28].
Remark 30. A n-person game form g : X1×· · · Xn → A is called rectangular if for each outcome a ∈ A, its pre-image g−1(a)
is a box of X , that is, g−1(a) = X ′1 × · · · X ′n, where X ′i ⊆ Xi for i = 1, . . . , n.
It was also mentioned in Remark 3 of [26] that tightness is sufficient for Nash-solvability of a rectangular n-person game
form g and, moreover, g is the normal form of a positional n-person game form modeled by a tree if and only if g is tight
and rectangular. The last statement was proven in [27]; see also [32].
Getting a similar characterization of the normal form of a cycle game form is an interesting open problem.
In this section, we give a mini-survey of results on Nash-solvability of n-person Chess-like games, in which all dicycles
form one outcome (in contrast to cycle games, where each dicycle is a separate outcome) and also of games with mean and
additive payoffs. Here, we consider n-person positional game forms and do not assume that VT = ∅; in other words, the set
of positions is partitioned into n+ 1 subsets, P : V = V1 ∪ · · · ∪ Vn ∪ VT .
12.2. Chess-like n-person games; all dicycles form a unique outcome
It seems that Nash-solvability might be implied by the following assumption suggested in [1,2,5–7].
• (0) all dicycles are equivalent, that is, they form a unique outcome c; in other words, the set of all outcomes A is VT ∪ {c}.
In contrast, the subject of the present paper is the cycle games, that is, the case when each dicycle is a separate outcome.
In both cases, a utility function is an arbitrary mapping u : I × A → R.
The games that satisfy condition (0) are called the Chess-like games [2,5]; see also [1,6,7].
Remark 31. Obviously, the classical game of Chess is a Chess-like game. Indeed, in Chess all infinite plays are equivalent,
since each such play is defined as a draw. Moreover, Chess is a two-person (n = 2) gamewith a zero-sum payoff u that takes
three values±1 and 0; in particular, u(c) = 0. The games on arbitrary digraphs satisfying all above conditions were called
Chess-like games in [2]. In [5], it was found convenient to extend this concept to the n-person case with an arbitrary payoff
u : I×A → R, provided condition (0) holds. In [7], such games were called by the abbreviation ‘‘AIPFOOT’’: All Infinite Plays
FormOne Outcome, in addition to the Terminals; in [1,6] theywere named just ‘‘the gameswith cycles’’. The following three
conjectures were suggested in [6].
Conjecture 1. Every n-person Chess-like game has a Nash equilibrium.
It is known that the conjecture holds in the following two cases:
• (i) digraph−→G is acyclic, that is, it has no dicycles at all, and
• (ii) for the two-person case, |I| = 2.
Remark 32. In case (i), the result is referred to as the Zermelo–Kuhn–Gale theorem. The concept of equilibrium was
introduced in 1950 by Nash [44]; see also [45]. Soon after this, Kuhn [36,37] and Gale [19] suggested a constructive proof
of Nash-solvability for the case (i). Strictly speaking, they considered only the trees, yet, the algorithm, so-called backward
induction, can be easily extended to the acyclic digraphs.
Let us also notice that in case (i) assumption (0) is irrelevant, since there are no dicycles.
Interestingly, an efficient, ‘‘almost’’ linear-time, algorithm (somewhat similar to backward induction) for the two-person
zero-sum games was suggested just recently, independently in [2,7]; see also [5].
Actually, studying case (ii) started very long ago. In 1912, Zermelo gave his seminal talk ‘‘Über eine Anwendung der
Mengenlehre auf die Theorie des Schachspiels’’ [49]. In fact, his analysis is applicable not only to Chess but to any two-
person zero-sum game modeled by a finite digraph. Moreover, this digraph may contain dicycles. Indeed, a position can be
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repeated in a Chess play and in this case the play results in a draw. Thus, in Chess all dicycles are equivalent, since they form
a unique outcome, namely, a draw.
Accurately speaking, a Chess play results in a draw only when the same position appears three times. Yet, we assume that
both players are restricted to their positional strategies. Hence, a position will be repeated infinitely whenever it appears
just twice.
In case (ii), Conjecture 1 easily results from Theorem 2. The following proof was suggested in [6].
Proof. By Theorem 2, it is sufficient to prove±1-solvability rather than Nash-solvability.
Hence, we can assume that there are two players, I = {1, 2}, and each outcome a ∈ A = VT ∪ {c} is either winning for
player 1 and losing for 2, or vice versa. Let us assume w.l.o.g. that c is winning for 1.
Then, let VT = V 1T ∪ V 2T be the partition of all terminals into outcomes winning for players 1 and 2, respectively.
Furthermore, let V 2 ⊆ V denote the set of all positions from which player 2 can enforce V 2T ; in particular, V 2T ⊆ V 2. Finally,
let us set V 1 = V \ V 2; in particular, V 1T ⊆ V 1.
By these definitions, in every position j ∈ V1 ∩ V 1 player 1 can stay out of V 2, that is, (s)he has a move (j, j′) such that
j′ ∈ V 1. Let us fix a strategy x01 that chooses such amove in each position j ∈ V1∩V 1 and anymove in j ∈ V1∩V 2. Then, for any
x2 ∈ X2, the outcome g(x01, x2) is winning for player 1 whenever the initial position j0 is in V 1. Indeed, either g(x01, x2) ∈ V 1T ,
or g(x01, x2) = c; in both cases player 1 wins. Thus, player 1 wins when j0 ∈ V 1; similarly, 2 wins when j0 ∈ V 2; in both
cases a saddle point exists. 
However, Theorem 2 is not applicable in the n-person case; see Section 12.1 and [26,28,4].
Then, in addition to (0), the following extra assumption introduced in [6] might be important too.
• (iii) Outcome c is worse than any terminal outcome, for each player.
Several interpretations of this assumption were suggested in [6] (see Remark 2 and Section 2.1.1) together with the
following relaxation of Conjecture 1.
Conjecture 2. Assumptions (0) and (iii) imply Nash-solvability.
Under assumptions (0) and (iii), Nash-solvability was proved in [6] for two more cases:
• (iv) play-once games, in which each player controls a unique position;
• (v) three outcomes, |A| ≤ 3, that is, there are at most two terminals, |VT | ≤ 2, and c.
Recently in [9], the latter statement was extended to the case (vi) |A| ≤ 4.
Thus, Nash-solvability results from: (0, i), or (0, ii), or (0, iii, iv), or (0, iii, vi).
Remark 33. Even if assumptions (0)would imply existence of a Nash equilibrium, yet, this equilibrium can certainly depend
on the initial position. In other words, a uniform (sometimes also called ‘‘subgame perfect’’) Nash equilibrium may fail to
exist already in a two-person (but not zero-sum) Chess-like game satisfying (iii). The corresponding example was recently
constructed in [5]. When (iii) is not assumed and also for the three-person games similar examples were obtained earlier
[1,6,38,46].
In contrast, a two-person zero-sum cycle game may have no saddle point, yet, uniformmaxmin and minmax strategies
always exist, according to Section 4.
Remark 34. Assumption (iii) is instrumental and in many cases it can significantly simplify proofs of Nash-solvability,
because by (iii), all players can use cycling as a ‘‘punishment’’. Yet, no case is known for which Nash-solvability fails in
general but could be enforced by assuming (iii). For example, both Conjectures 1 and 2 hold for n = 2 and are open in
general, while the subgame perfect Nash-solvability fails already for n = 2 and even under assumption (iii) [5].
12.3. Additive payoffs
As we already mentioned, Conjecture 2 is a relaxation of Conjecture 1. Yet, in [6], Conjecture 2 was strengthen in an
alternative way based on the following generalization of the terminal payoffs.
Given a digraph
−→
G = (V ,−→E ), let us define a local reward as a mapping r : I ×−→E → R.
Standardly, the value r(i,−→e ) is interpreted as the profit obtained by the player i ∈ I whenever the play passes the
directed edge −→e ∈ −→E . Let us recall that each situation x ∈ X defines a unique play p = p(x) that begins in the initial
position j0 and either (a) terminates in VT or (b) results in a dicycle c = c(x).
The additive effective payoff u : I × X → R is defined as follows. In case (a), it equals the sum of all local rewards of the
obtained play, u(i, x) =∑−→e ∈p(x) r(i,−→e ), and u(i, x) ≡ −∞ for all i ∈ I in case (b).
In particular, all dicycles are equivalent and the corresponding outcome a∞ is the most unwanted for all players, in
agreement with assumption (iii). Yet, unlike the previous subsection, the set of the remaining outcomes is formed by
the acyclic plays, that is, by all simple dipaths from j0 to VT , rather than by the terminal set VT itself. The following two
assumptions were suggested in [6]:
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• (t) all local rewards are non-positive, r(i,−→e ) ≤ 0 for all i ∈ I and−→e ∈ −→E , and
• (tt) all dicycles are non-positive,∑−→e ∈ C r(i,−→e ) ≤ 0 for all dicycles c ∈ C = C(−→G ).
Remark 35. In [6], all players i ∈ I minimize cost function −u(i, x) rather than maximizing payoff u(i, x). Thus, −r(i,−→e )
are interpreted as local costs and conditions (t, tt) turn into non-negativity conditions in [6].
Obviously, (t) implies (tt).Moreover, itwas shown in 1958byGallai [20] that in fact these two assumptions are equivalent,
since (t) can be enforced by a potential transformation whenever (tt) holds; see [20], and also [6], for definitions and more
details.
Conjecture 3. Assumptions (t, tt) imply Nash-solvability.
This conjecture was suggested in [6], where it was also shown that assumptions (t, tt) are essential; see two examples of
Section 2.1 in Figures 5 and 6 of [6].
Remark 36. At least, assumptions (t) and (tt) look logical. Indeed, since a dicycle c is repeated infinitely, it becomes very
attractive (respectively, unattractive) for a player i ∈ I whenever the corresponding sum ∑−→e ∈ C r(i,−→e ) is positive
(respectively, negative). Assumptions (t, tt) reflect the second case. It would be strange to assume that a positive cycle is
the most unwanted outcome for the corresponding player.
In [6], Conjecture 3 is proven for the play-once games, in which each player controls a unique position.
It was also shown in [6] that Conjecture 3, if true, would result in Conjecture 2 (but not in Conjecture 1).
This observation is not difficult. It is sufficient to notice that the additive payoffs considered in this subsection generalize
the terminal payoffs of the previous one. A local reward r is called transition free if r(i, e) = 0 unless e is a terminal
move. Clearly, the corresponding additive effective payoffs are equivalent with the terminal effective payoffs that satisfy
assumption (iii).
Remark 37. In case of a transition free payoff one can assume w.l.o.g. that there is only one terminal [6].
It is easy to show [6] that a minimal counterexample to Conjecture 3 must have the following property:
• (ttt) in digraph−→G , every dicycle and play (a dipath from j0 to a terminal of VT ) intersect.
This property has many interesting structural corollaries; in particular, it implies Nash-solvability [6].
12.4. Mean payoffs
Let us re-assume that VT = ∅ or, equivalently, that A = C = C(−→G ), by Remark 3.
Then, for every situation x ∈ X the corresponding play p(x) results in a dicycle c(x) ∈ C . Furthermore, let us ‘‘slightly’’
modify the additive payoff by setting
u(i, x) = |c(x)|−1
−
−→e ∈ C(x)
r(i,−→e ) for all x ∈ X,
where |c| is the length of a dicycle c , that is, the number of its edges or, equivalently, vertices.
This formula defines the so-called mean effective payoff. It was introduced by Moulin [42,43], Ehrenfeucht and
Mycielski [15,16], and it is interpreted as the Cesaro average of the local rewards, or in other words, as the local reward per
one move of the play p(x). Let us also notice that the mean effective payoff is a special case of the cycle payoff considered in
this article. This case appears to be solvable.
A two-person zero-sum mean-payoff game has a saddle point in pure positional (uniformly optimal) strategies.
This statement was proven in [42,43] for the case of complete bipartite digraphs and symmetric local rewards, then
in [16], for any bipartite digraphs, and finally in [33], for any digraphs. Yet, Nash-solvability fails already for two-person
(but not zero-sum) mean-payoff games. An example on the complete bipartite 3 × 3 digraph was constructed in [30]; see
also [33]. This example is minimal, since Nash-solvability holds in case of 2× k bipartite digraphs [31]. However, no other
sufficient conditions are known.
Remark 38. Thus, Nash-solvability and zero-sum solvability differ for the mean-payoff games. In contrast, these two
properties are equivalent for the two-person game forms; see parts (ii) and (iii) of Theorem 2.
In the last decade, two-person zero-summean-payoff games and their applications got a lot of attention, mostly, due to
their open complexity status. No polynomial algorithm for these games is known, although the problem is in the intersection
of NP and co-NP [35]; see the survey by Vorobyov [48] for more details.
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